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Feature Article 
SCOTTISH LOWLAND AIRPORTS POLICY: PROSPECT AND RETROSPECT 
James Stevens, Department of Economics, 
Stewart Dunlop, Strathclyde International Business Unit, 
University of Strathclyde 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines Scottish lowland airports 
policy and reviews the changing forces which 
govern its feasibility and coherence. The current 
policy seeks to segment Scottish demand by 
developing lowland airports in complementary 
roles. Glasgow and Edinburgh cater for short haul 
international and domestic traffic whilst 
Prestwick caters for long haul, mainly 
transatlantic business. The major thrust of this 
paper is to seek to demonstrate that this policy 
does not and cannot work. In terms of the 
transatlantic market, other lowland airports offer 
indirect services through London and other centres 
and thus compete with Prestwick for this business. 
In addition, the forced partition of services in 
Scotland does not allow the emergence of the 
maximum possible level of service in the region 
and thus fails to attain a key goal of airports 
policy. In terms of airline economics, there is no 
good reason why North American services cannot use 
other lowland airports. This has been the 
situation since the late 1970's. We conclude that 
there is a strong case in terms of employment and 
wider economic development considerations for 
abandoning the present arrangements. We argue that 
this will impose certain adjustments at Prestwick 
and suggest a course of action to stimulate 
activity at this location. In our view, this can 
be facilitated through the construction of better 
road links to and from Ayrshire which are both 
overdue and vital to the proper development of the 
local economy. 
Section 2 outlines UK air transport policies. In 
this part we attempt to trace the history and 
evolution of UK civil aviation and airports 
policy. We demonstrate that, in recent times, 
government has sought to further national 
objectives through the pursuit of greater 
liberalisation of air services. Section 3 examines 
Scottish policy in detail and seeks to establish 
that liberalisation has served to undermine 
lowland policy objectives rather than further 
their successful attainment. In addition we review 
the arguments for change and document how these 
gained force and clarity in the troubled period of 
the early 1980's. Section 4 analyses the scope and 
methodology of the 1985 review of lowlands policy. 
We are extremely critical of the partial nature of 
this exercise which completely ignored likely 
overall benefits which would accompany change. We 
conclude that the review makes a strong case for 
change and can find no sound economic reason why 
Government maintained the status quo. In Section 5 
we trace how wider economic development 
considerations have served to reinforce the 
attitudes of both the parties to the lowland 
policy debate. We take the view that the strong 
resistance to change in Ayrshire is ultimately 
grounded in a wider set of concerns about the 
Ayrshire economy. We conclude that Government must 
address these underlying anxieties. We present our 
observations on the forthcoming review in Section 
6. The case for change is now unanswerable and we 
advocate an open skies policy in terms of 
transatlantic business. We urge Government to 
develop a range of activity at Prestwick and 
emphasise the need to support these measures with 
proper labour market policies and a major 
programme of infrastructure provision. 
2. UK AIR TRANSPORT POLICY 
Air transport is properly and universally 
regarded as a strategic issue deserving of clear 
objectives and effective policy measures. All UK 
governments have taken it as axiomatic that an 
appropriate air transport network is a necessary 
condition for the functioning and growth of an 
advanced economic system whose markets are open to 
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foreign competition and which seeks to serve as an 
optimal location for internationally mobile 
foreign direct investments. 
The air transport industry consists of two 
distinct elements, airlines and airports. 
Successive governments have determined specific 
but inter-related policies for both sectors. 
Airline policy is concerned mainly with the 
promotion of opportunities for UK carriers to 
increase their share of the global air transport 
market. The arrangements for air travel between 
the UK and other countries are subject to a set of 
bilateral arrangements (Air Service Agreements or 
ASA's) which specify, inter alia, tariffs, points 
of entry, capacity and designated carriers. In 
addition, some ASA's call for revenue-pooling by 
the designated carriers. Thus, in terms of 
international air travel, UK government is 
constrained by the outlook and preferences of 
other sovereign states and policy must operate 
against this background. 
Recent Civil Aviation policy has its origins in 
the Edwards Committee Report published in 1969. 
This Committee advocated the development of a 
competitive multi-airline framework to accommodate 
the projected rapid growth in demand for air 
travel. Subsequent policy has sought to engender 
this in different ways. In the 1980's, the 
Conservative government instructed the Civil 
Aviation Authority (CAA) to assess the scope for 
competition between UK airlines on domestic and 
international routes. In response to this report, 
the Government issued a White Paper (Cmnd 9366) 
which set out the objectives of Civil Aviation 
policy. In addition to ensuring high standards of 
safety within the industry, the Governments policy 
goals were stated as; 
"a) to encourage a sound and competitive 
multi-airline industry with a variety of 
airlines of different characteristics 
serving the whole range of travellers 
needs and strong enough to compete 
aggressively against foreign airlines: 
b) to promote competition in all markets: 
internationally by working to reduce 
restrictions on services and by making it 
easier for new airlines to enter the 
market: and domestically by cutting out 
controls on new services and on fares 
and capacity; 
c) to ensure adequate safeguards against 
anti-competitive or predatory practices 
by airlines , so as to safeguard the long 
term interest of the public through the 
maintenance of a competitive industry; 
d) to put the ownership of British Airways 
into the hands of private investors, 
including its employees, so as to remove 
it from both the restrictions and 
protection of state ownership." 
In line with these objectives, the Conservative 
government has consistently pressed for greater 
competition on international routes through the 
re-negotiation of more liberal ASA's. Cmnd 9336 
sets out the steps taken and comments favourably 
on the bilateral agreement between the UK and 
Holland which permits carriers to "mount new 
services between the two countries at whatever 
capacity it thinks appropriate and to charge any 
fares approved by the country in which the traffic 
originates"(para 10). The White Paper further 
states that "the long term goal must be to 
liberalise services wherever possible- where 
foreign competition is fair and Britain's 
interests are not prejudiced" (para 8). 
Whilst the Government determines objectives and 
policies for civil aviation, the success of these 
depends on the efficient provision of an adequate 
and optimally located airport capacity. The 
fundamental objective of UK airports policy is 
unchanging. Cmnd 9452 concludes that " the 
policies announced in this White Paper seek to 
protect the UK's position in world aviation". Thus 
air transport policy is essentially mercantilist 
and alterations in policy relate to differences in 
perception as to how national goals are best 
achieved. The last Labour administration reviewed 
airports policy in 1978. The review was preceded 
by a wide-ranging consultative exercise involving 
both direct and related interests. The subsequent 
White Paper sets out policy measures based the 
following view of the industry. Civil aviation is 
viewed as a core activity supporting 
competitiveness in other sectors. The South-East 
airport system .particularly Heathrow,attracts an 
unparalled network of international flights. The 
catchment area is designated as Northern Europe 
and the airport is viewed as being in competition 
with other European centres such as Amsterdam and 
Paris. The vast proportion of domestic demand for 
South-East air services originates in the South-
East and serves as the core business for the 
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system. The distribution of activity between 
airports in the system has emphasised Heathrow as 
a centre for scheduled services thus building up 
the range and frequency required by the 
commercial, financial and industrial organisations 
located or headquartered in the region. Before 
privatisation, British Airways the national 
carrier, maintained a massive international 
route network at Heathrow. In essence, BA provided 
the backbone of the system's hub and spoke network 
as a key element of national policy. BA pic 
now carry out this strand of national policy on 
the basis of commercial judgement on competitive 
routes and monopoly rents from unliberalised long-
haul services. Airports policy concentrates 
heavily on maintaining sufficient capacity in the 
South-East in order to underwrite the 
international competitiveness of the system within 
its North European catchment This has provoked 
long-standing controversy over the continued 
expansion of terminal capacity at Heathrow. 
Policymakers explicitly reject that activity can 
be forcibly redirected to the regions. Thus, 
compulsory transfer of services, even if possible 
under existing ASA's, would only serve to weaken 
Heathrow as a hub and spoke centre and thus risk 
the system's predominance in its European role. 
This would be properly regarded as detrimental to 
the UK's long-run development interests and 
objectives. Outside London and the South-East, the 
market is viewed as being geographically 
segmented. Catchment areas are argued to exist, 
based on the regional conurbations. Cmnd 7084 
graded airports into 4 categories of which 
Category A, Gateway International Airports are of 
particular interest for present purposes. A 
Category A airport is defined as one which "would 
provide or be expected to support over time, a 
wide range and frequency of services, including 
inter-continental services and a full range of 
domestic services."(Cmnd 7084, para 16). Two 
such airports were specified outside the London 
area , Manchester and Prestwick/Glasgow. Regional 
airports are defined in order to cater for" the 
principal air traffic demands of individual 
regions, parts of regions or groups of regions" 
(ibid, para 16). These demands were identified as 
"the provision of a network of short-haul 
international services, a significant range of 
chartered services and domestic services including 
links to gateway airports". 
The 1978 White Paper was concerned with planning 
and rationalisation in order to engender the 
successful development of airports in line with 
the specified categorisation. Since airports were 
largely in the public domain, the government was 
in a strong position to influence expenditure 
and implement its chosen strategy. Thus, 
Manchester was to develop the provision of long-
haul services for the North and other airports in 
that region would provide links to it, the South-
East system and further afield. The growth of 
Manchester in this role was envisaged as being 
limited by the demand for long-haul services 
within its North and Midlands catchment area It's 
growth would be determined by it's ability to 
attract Northern travellers currently interlining 
through the South-East system. 
The Conservative government reviewed airports 
policy in the early 1980's and published a White 
Paper, Cmnd 9452, in 1985. The requirement to 
restate policy resulted from a variety of sources, 
chief amongst which was the need to respond to the 
Inspectors Report for Expansion at Heathrow and 
Stansted in the light of the proposed 
denationalisation of BAA. Although operating as a 
profit-maximising company, a privatised BAA would 
operate within a wide set of constraints and 
strategic objectives determined by the government. 
Within a framework where " air transport 
facilities should not in general be subsidised by 
the taxpayer or ratepayer" the Government set down 
the following objectives of policy. (Cmnd 9452,p5) 
a) "to foster a strong and competitive 
British airline industry by providing 
enough airport capacity where needed; 
b) to minimise the impact of airports on the 
environment generally; 
c) to make the best use of existing 
facilities and provide new capacity only 
when it is economically justified; 
d) to encourage the use and development of 
regional airports so that they can meet 
the maximum demands they can attract; 
e) to support the leading position of 
Heathrow and Gatwick among the leading 
international airports and interlining 
centres; 
f) to encourage enterprise and efficiency in 
the operation of major airports by 
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providing for the introduction of private 
capital; 
g) to ensure that all UK airports continue 
to maintain the highest standards of 
safety in accordance with 
internationally accepted rules and 
standards". 
These objectives are presented in "no special 
order of priority". (Cmnd 9542, p5) 
The respective roles of the South-East and 
regional airports were re-affirmed and the 
Government's view and approach to the stimulation 
and evolution of demand were clearly set out. The 
Government rejected an immediate fifth terminal at 
Heathrow and opted, against the advice of the 
direct interests, to expand activity at Stansted. 
This decision was heavily criticised by the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies(IFS) on the basis 
that the expansion at Stansted would not achieve a 
satisfactory return on capital. However, the 
Government appears to have adopted this course on 
the basis of environmental factors at existing 
sites and the wish to evolve of capacity to 
facilitate the goal of developing a competitive UK 
airline industry. Thus, Heathrow was to be 
constrained and BA's entrenchment confirmed. 
However, pressure of demand was expected to focus 
opportunities for developing a rival network at 
Gatwick with B.Cal and other UK independents to 
the fore. 
The issue of whether the actual measures taken 
were correct is both complex and not vital for the 
present exercise. The key factor to appreciate is 
government acted on the basis that greater 
liberalisation of air services was a measure which 
could facilitate the national objectives of 
maintaining London's strong international position 
and of fostering a competitive multi-airline 
industry in the UK. However, it should be noted 
that in these twin policy reviews, the Government 
specified the investment plans of BAA and settled 
on the scale of BA. Both were privatised and value 
measured on that basis. In future, finding the 
capital for costly airport infrastructure falls 
upon the owners of BAA pic. If the government 
wishes the company to deviate from the preferred 
financial option to another, or if the government 
constrains investment at BAA sites to allow a 
competitor to establish facilities, this would 
affect the value of BAA's shares. It remains to be 
seen how Government will view these issues when 
they arise. This could be relevant in Scotland 
following a review of policy. 
Like the previous administration, the 
Conservatives rejected notions of forced diversion 
of activity to the regions and held the view that" 
the routes flown from regional airports are 
largely a matter for the commercial decisions of 
airlines where they consider that demand is 
sufficient" (Cmnd 9452, para 6.8). The White Paper 
emphasised the commitment to the development of 
Manchester as the sole English Category A airport 
outwith the South-East and outlined measures 
taken to expedite matters. In line with its more 
liberal civil aviation policy, these emphasised 
the promotion of Manchester and other regional 
locations in bilateral negotiations. Thus, the 
development of regional airports in England was 
expected to benefit from liberalisation and 
government actively raised regional airport 
activity during international discussions. The 
government is involved with other parties, 
including airlines , on the development of rolling 
5-year plans for Manchester " to explore ways of 
increasing its range of international services" 
(ibid, para 6.29). However, it should be noted 
that this is far from an open skies policy. As in 
the South-east, the Government sought to guide the 
evolution of capacity. Thus, Birmingham is denied 
Category A status and activity is steered towards 
Manchester to encourage the formation of a strong 
regional hub. At other regional centres, the 
commercial decisions of operators determine the 
scope of an airports short haul route network. 
We conclude this section with a summary of the 
salient points. The previous Labour administration 
set the roles of all UK airports and sanctioned 
infrastructure developments on that basis. Post 
1979, the Conservatives have sought to use the 
pursuit and attainment of liberalised air services 
to achieve broader national policy goals. These 
include the development of the planned national 
and regional airports systems. The tensions 
between national airports policy and the wishes 
of independent owners and operators have surfaced 
in both the South-East and the Regions. As we 
shall see, such tensions are manifest in the 
Scottish context. 
3. SCOTTISH LOWLANDS AIRPORT POLICY: 1978-84 
Scotland's lowland airports are regional 
airports, serving a well defined catchment area. 
Thus the 1978 White Paper sets out that " Scotland 
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forms a distinct unit in airport planning terms. 
The scope for diverting London traffic to Scotland 
, apart from traffic with Scottish origins or 
destinations at present interlining through 
London, is negligible, and , with the limited 
exception of the extent to which people in the 
Borders might look towards the North of England, 
there is no overlap with the catchment areas of 
airports in England and Wales" (Cmnd 7084, para 
136). 
Airport capacity in Central Scotland had been 
provided on a lavish scale. The 1978 White Paper 
comments that "there is probably a greater excess 
of airports capacity in this region than anywhere 
else in Great Britain" (ibid, para 137). Prestwick 
is situated on the West Coast and the locational 
choice reflects an era when available aircraft 
technology determined that planes could travel 
relatively short distances. Thus, airports such as 
Prestwick, Shannon in Ireland and Gander in North 
America developed close to either end of the 
shortest transatlantic routes. Glasgow and 
Edinburgh were built nearer to their respective 
population centres to satisfy domestic and short-
haul demand which implied smaller aircraft and 
shorter runway facilities. The principal runway 
at Prestwick is 2987 metres long whilst those at 
Glasgow and Edinburgh are 2658 metres and 2500 
metres respectively. 
The roles of each of these airports were first 
specified in a parliamentary answer in 1968, 
which set out that Scottish demand was to be 
segmented and airports allocated complementary 
roles . Prestwick was to continue in its capacity 
as sole transatlantic gateway as originally 
specified in the 1946 Bermuda 1 ASA covering US-UK 
services. Both Glasgow and Edinburgh would cater 
for short-haul and domestic services. The 1978 
White Paper did not conclude on this arrangement 
but argued that " the roles of the three Lowland 
airports should be a matter for the proposed 
Scottish Assembly" (Cmnd 7084, para 164). The 
review rejected notions of rationalisation to a 
single central airport but noted that there was 
pressure for the division of services to be 
abandoned. As Gillett (1983) outlines, BAA in 
consultation with the Scottish office and the 
Transport Ministry conducted a further review and 
consultation exercise. This exercise set out a 
wide range of basic data and evaluated 3 major 
options. Option A preserved the status quo, 
whilst Option B entertained the notion that 
charter flights could exercise freedom of choice. 
Option C set out an open skies policy in which all 
operators had a free choice of airports. The 
analysis demonstrated that the status quo remained 
the most financially attractive solution to BAA. 
In order to transfer flights from Prestwick to 
Glasgow or Edinburgh it was suggested that 
substantial investments in runway and terminal 
facilities would be needed. In addition, the BAA 
would be required to carry the fixed costs of 
Prestwick with a significantly reduced level of 
business. This exercise was supplemented by a 
major conference held in November 1978 at which 
interested parties were given the opportunity to 
comment on the analysis and the conclusions 
derived. Gillett's assessment is that "the 
analysis of each of these options was thorough and 
reads convincingly" (ibid, para 111). However, as 
Gillett notes, a persistent and vociferous 
objector to the conclusions was British Airways, 
who advocated transference to Glasgow. The airline 
questioned the scale of the alleged capital 
expenditure requirements, arguing that they were 
based on redundant technology. On the basis on a 
detailed study dating from 1976, the airline 
viewed the prospects for stimulating business at 
Prestwick to be poor. Given the increasing 
emphasis on commercial criteria in air transport 
decisions, these reservations have proved to be a 
major source of pressure for change. 
The new Conservative Government accepted the 
conclusions of the BAA review exercise and in 
December 1979, the Transport Ministry issued a 
statement to that effect. However, in the early 
1980's, the external environment altered in a 
number of ways which rendered the policy 
increasingly untenable. First, there was a 
downturn in world aviation markets from which the 
UK was not exempt. Activity at most UK airports 
declined sharply at the beginning of the decade 
and grew slowly until 1984. In Scotland, the 
recession impacted most strongly at Prestwick, 
where in the autumn of 1981, BA announced the 
closure of its base and a phased withdrawal of 
services by March 1982. In February 1982, Laker 
Airways collapsed in controversial circumstances 
occasioning a further loss of services. Thus 
between 1981/2 and 1982/3, terminal passengers 
and cargo and mail handled at Prestwick 
declined by 30%. The airport had been experiencing 
a sharp decline in Air Traffic Movements (ATM's) 
since the start of the decade and this had the 
effect both of intensifying the losses at 
Prestwick and deflating the prospects for Scottish 
Airports as a group. These poor results were 
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particularly unwelcome at a time when the UK 
government seemed intent on controlling subsidies 
to unprofitable activity and had set an early 
target for break-even by the Scottish group. 
Such setbacks inevitably focused attention upon 
the feasibility of the air traffic distribution 
policy operating in Scotland. Tables 1 and 2 set 
out various measures of airport activity for the 
period in question . Table 1 indicates the trends 
in activity for Scotland, Manchester and the 
South-East. In terms of all three measures , 
Scotland was failing to perform in line with other 
centres. There was particular interest in Scottish 
circles that Manchester seemed to be performing 
better than the more fragmented Scottish system. 
Table 2 sets out the Scottish share of 
transatlantic business in terms of terminal 
passengers and air transport movements. The data 
does not represent the UK market because it 
excludes activity at Manchester and other regional 
airports. This presentation is deliberate because 
it reflects the official view that UK airports do 
not compete for such aspects of business. These 
figures measure the extent to which direct 
transatlantic air services from Scotland are 
growing more slowly than those from the South-
East. As indicated above, a key element in 
regional airports policy involves the development 
of two category A airports outwith the London area 
to cater for inter-continental demand within their 
catchment areas. The data does not measure 
evolution of demand because an alternative conduit 
to Scottish transatlantic gateways exists in the 
South-East. The data indicates a failure to 
maintain activity shares. Allowing for the 
likelihood that Scottish demand for transatlantic 
services grew more slowly than in the South-East, 
the data poses the question of the extent to which 
part of this loss of share is accounted for by a 
failure of Scottish services based at Prestwick to 
prevent Scottish passengers from interlining at 
London. Indeed, evidence available during the 
period suggests that Prestwick's demand was 
highly seasonal and concentrated in the leisure 
market. Prestwick commands a relatively low 
proportion of the high margin business market on 
its vNorth American routes. The limited range and 
frequency of services appears to impose costs on 
the business user which more than offset those 
derived from interlining at London or elsewhere. 
The implications of the above for regional airport 
policy are stark. In Scotland, policy seeks to 
segment demand and engender a complementarity of 
roles. However, the effect of the policy is to 
promote competition between Lowland airports. 
Glasgow and Edinburgh are spokes in the South-
East system and other hubs. This fact ensures that 
operators with transatlantic capacity at other 
centres will market these multi-stage 
transatlantic options aggressively. Indeed, the 
early 1980's saw a complete liberalisation of the 
domestic market resulting in frequent and 
competitive services on Anglo-Scottish routes. It 
is in the direct interest of the operators to 
market their London-based transatlantic flights. 
Thus there is competition between infrequent and 
limited services available directly and a wide 
range of frequent services available indirectly 
from Glasgow and Edinburgh. In short, airport 
policy is fundamentally flawed in its Scottish 
application because the division of capacity 
between Prestwick and other Lowland sites 
militates against the emergence of the maximum 
possible level of direct international services. 
This in turn imposes resource costs upon 
passengers whose requirements dictate that they 
interline at non-Scottish hubs. Thus the traffic 
distribution rules chosen for Scotland neither 
work nor achieve the demand objectives outlined 
for either Category A airports or regional 
centres. 
In the early eighties, such arguments were far 
from universally accepted in Scotland and a 
substantial body of opinion maintained that, with 
sufficient time and effort, the situation at 
Prestwick could be improved. A prime mover in this 
respect was the Select Committee on Scottish 
Affairs which examined the circumstances of 
Prestwick following the loss of BA and Laker 
services in 1982. In many respects, the Committee 
took an appropriate view of the situation. 
Unfortunately, it did not question the 
continuation of Prestwick's transatlantic 
monopoly, pointing out that the situation had been 
resolved in 1979 and that frequent reviews would 
serve only to undermine the successful attainment 
of set objectives. The Committee approached the 
problem by regarding the site as a centre of 
economic activity and advocated a number of 
measures to bolster existing operations and 
promote diversification. With respect to air 
services, the Report concentrated on the poor 
quality of surface access to the airport and the 
relatively high level of landing charges compared 
with the South-east system. In the case of the 
former, the Committee advocated the construction 
of a rail halt and the upgrading of road 
connections to the Glasgow conurbation. In the 
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latter respect, the Committee called for the 
charges to be reduced to encourage the growth of 
services. 
In light of strong representations from , inter 
alia, Kyle and Carrick District Council, the 
Committee recommended that a freeport be 
established at the airport in the hope that such 
a development would encourage the attraction of a 
wide range of industry and progressively stimulate 
both cargo and passenger activity. The Committee, 
with considerable encouragement from the SDA, also 
sought to build upon the existing British 
Aerospace and Caledonian Airmotive plants through 
the creation of an Aviation Industry Park. 
Thus, the Select Committee sought to isolate a 
package of measures which would jointly stimulate 
business at the site. In order to coordinate the 
inputs of the various organisations concerned, 
the Committee called for a Prestwick Airport 
Development Company to be formed, comprising 
representatives from all interested parties. In 
the event, the Government rejected or vacillated 
over many of the measures and have invited the 
criticism that the means were never willed to 
make lowland airports policy work. However, this 
report presented a substantial set of arguments 
concerning the need to view Prestwick as a site of 
business opportunity for which development plans 
required to be agreed, resourced and implemented. 
This insight remains valid to this day. 
Hence, the misfortunes of Prestwick in the early 
part of the decade generated contrary analyses. On 
one view, Prestwick was an air transport cul-de-
sac with little development potential. On the 
other, the development of a Category A airport 
remained possible given sufficient time, effort 
and resources. Although we would seek to refute 
this latter argument, it should be acknowledged 
that it attracted many influential adherents and 
proved a significant barrier to change. 
The second trend which acted to undermine the case 
for the retention of Prestwick's transatlantic 
monopoly relates to aircraft technology. As 
suggested above, Prestwick's basic source of 
advantage over other lowland airports derives from 
superior site characteristics. It possesses a 
longer runway offering take-offs over the Firth of 
Clyde and ground facilities able to handle an 
appropriate number of larger jets simultaneously. 
The 1978 review of Lowland policy ruled against 
change on the basis that it would imply either 
substantial capital investment on terminals and 
runways or significant revenue penalties owing to 
reduced passenger and cargo payloads at other 
lowland sites. However, in terms of situation, 
the Ayrshire airport lies farther from the bulk of 
Scottish population than the allegedly inferior 
sites at either Abbotsinch and Turnhouse. Hence, 
in 1978, Prestwick survived because its superior 
site characteristics were viewed as more than 
offsetting the disadvantages of its inferior 
situation. 
This conclusion was never accepted by carriers who 
argued that the review overstated the capital 
costs associated with change and inflated the 
payload penalties evident at Glasgow and 
Edinburgh. The basis of this charge was that the 
1978 review had ignored trends in Boeing 747 
technology which had resulted in aircraft well 
suited to such smaller runways. According to 
British Airways, economic transatlantic services 
could have been operating from Glasgow and 
Edinburgh from the late seventies with the 
available 747-2 technology . In addition, Miller 
(1982) pointed to the advances in the reliability 
of twin-engine jets and the potential to improve 
the financial attractiveness of thin markets 
deriving from a reduction in operating costs in 
relation to seating capacity. The lighter aircraft 
also imply less exacting runway and terrain 
conditions making them tailor made for the Glasgow 
and Edinburgh sites. In consequence, the capital 
expenditure required to accomodate transatlantic 
services at these locations falls substantially 
and ties in with the existing development 
programmes based on terminal expansions to 
accomodate similar technology on short-haul 
routes. However, in the early eighties, this 
technology was constrained in its use over large 
stretches of water by a requirement that a twin-
engine aircraft be less than 90 minutes flying 
time from a diversionary airport. This restriction 
placed significant cost penalties on 
transatlantic routes and implied seasonal 
travelling difficulties owing to the high 
probability that winter weather would frequently 
close the diversionary airports in Iceland and 
Greenland. It was not until the late 1980's that 
these restrictions were relaxed. Thus, advances 
in aircraft technology conspired to erode the 
infrastructural arguments against altering 
Lowlands policy, and no such argument has existed 
since the late 1970's. This is the case for both 
twin engine and four engine technology. 
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The third major trend to militate against the 
continuation of Prestwick's transatlantic gateway 
status was the emergence of medium-term 
development strategies which sought to promote 
both Glasgow and Edinburgh as commercial and 
financial centres. In particular, the importance 
of a suitable supply of airline services to the 
coherence of such strategies began to be 
explicitly recognised. The McKinsey Report 
commissioned by the Glasgow City Centre Joint 
Economic Initiative, which served to define the 
strategy of Glasgow Action, commented that the 
poor image of the city resulted partly from a 
perception of remoteness, based largely on the 
inadequacies of the current air service provision. 
Thus, in the early 1980's, the arguments 
concerning an air systems ability to induce 
employment through improved locational perception 
emerged with particular clarity. For example, in 
1984, Labour-controlled Strathclyde Regional 
Council argued that " airports can act as as key 
building blocks within the regional economy. The 
quality , range and frequency of air services can 
have a considerable bearing on the promotional 
aspects of a regional economy. Not only do 
improved air services benefit the indigenous 
population, but they can have an important impact 
on the areas image, particularly in terms of its 
general accessibility" (SRC (1984), p66). This 
appreciation is based on a number of academic and 
government studies. In general, accessibility to a 
suitable network of domestic or international air 
services emerges as a clear but relatively weak 
influence in the location decisions of indigenous 
or multinational enterprises. However, Department 
of Trade and Industry (1984), highlights the 
importance of an inter-continental airport in the 
location decisions of international corporate 
headquarters. SDD (1987) reviews evidence 
available in the early eighties and reports that 
"inward investors" place higher emphasis on 
financial inducements, proximity to an 
international airport and environmental quality 
than indigenous firms (para 5.38). This Scottish 
Office Report highlights that, ceteris paribus, 
high technology and modern industry cite air 
transport as a key influence on locational choice. 
This appears to affect the decision in two ways. 
The business, for its own purposes may require 
access to good air transport communications and 
may wish to attract key personnel whose locational 
preferences are influenced by these factors. 
Once a region is settled on, internal transport 
links become significant in the detailed site 
choice. Thus agencies charged with strategic 
responsibilities began to advance the argument 
that a change of policy was necessary, albeit not 
sufficient , to facilitate wider regional 
development. This view was to gather both force 
and adherents throughout the remainder of the 
decade. 
The final noteworthy feature relates to the 
emerging trend in competition between UK airlines. 
Prior to the privatisation of BA, the position 
entered a state of flux. Independent operators 
both argued for a share of BA's routes and sought 
to establish new services . This was encouraged by 
the regulatory body, the CAA, who were concerned 
about the effects of a large and privately-owned 
BA on the evolution of a competitive airline 
industry. In 1983, British Midland sought and 
obtained permission to operate scheduled flights 
directly from Glasgow to North America. BAA's 
appeal to the Transport Secretary was upheld, but 
a review was commissioned into Lowlands policy. 
Thus, the effects of liberalisation and the 
consequent need for UK carriers to develop 
profitable opportunities focused attention on the 
beleaguered Scottish policy. In Scotland, 
liberalisation did not further policy objectives 
but served as a lever to undermine them. 
By the mid-eighties, the situation had changed 
dramatically from that prevailing in 1978. 
Activity at Prestwick had declined dramatically 
and the consistency and coherence of Lowlands 
policy was subject to continuing question. The 
advance of airline technology had demonstrably 
eroded Prestwick's locational advantage. In an 
environment where public policy sought to engender 
regional development of services based on 
commercial criteria, the key players , the 
airlines were emphatic that the scope for 
development at Prestwick was limited and refused 
to operate licences already granted. The decline 
in traditional manufacturing activity and the 
development of offsetting strategies based on 
attracting and stimulating industrial and 
commercial investment in Scotland had explicitly 
placed airport policy at the centre of wider 
development issues. It was against this background 
that the 1984 review was conducted and few 
observers expected Prestwick to survive in its 
role as Scotland's transatlantic gateway. 
4. THE 1985 REVIEW AND ITS AFTERMATH. 
The Review of policy which was conducted in 1985 
(the Ridley Review) was undertaken by officials 
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from the Scottish Office, Department of Transport 
and the Treasury with the assistance of the CAA 
and BAA. The terms of reference were to "review 
Scottish Lowlands airport policy, and in 
particular whether it continues to offer the best 
means of meeting Scotland's civil aviation 
requirements; and to assess the financial 
environmental and social consequences of any 
change"(Department of Transport(1984),para 2). The 
consultation document set out a series of issues 
to be explored in an attempt to define the areas 
where costs and benefits of change emerge and 
require quantification and analysis. 
The announcement of the review engendered the 
coalescence of active and vociferous groups both 
for and against change, mirroring the pattern set 
in 1978 and providing a good deal of heated 
discussion around the issue. The report of the 
working party was published in May 1985. The 
concluding statement of the (1985) report 
argues that, "the balance of financial and 
economic considerations would point towards a 
change in policy which concentrated operations at 
Glasgow and Edinburgh." (Ridley Review, para 169) 
However the report also focused upon environmental 
and social factors which, given a broader 
objective function, offset the perceived benefits 
of change. These are 
"a smaller reduction in noise near Glasgow 
and Edinburgh airports than would otherwise 
be expected" 
"an addition to unemployment in an Assisted 
Area." 
"adverse but unquantifiable effects on the 
Prestwick freeport project, aviation related 
business at the airport, and military 
operations at Prestwick." (Ridley Review: 
para 169) 
The Report also noted that 
"the considerations summarised above cannot 
be measured on any objective common scale; 
they must be judged essentially against 
political priorities. The group submit their 
analyses and conclusions in the hope that 
they will provide a factual background 
against which a political judgement can be 
made". (Ridley Review, para 169) 
The Government responded to this report in its 
1985 White paper on Airports Policy and rejected 
any change in Scottish Lowland policy. In 
justifying this decision, the Government made 
direct reference to the Ridley Review and set out 
that " the report identified economic benefits to 
airlines and their customers which could result 
from a change in policy to allow long-haul air 
services to use Glasgow and Edinburgh. But it also 
identified social and environmental disadvantages 
which such a change would entail , and so did not 
make any firm recommendations for a change of 
policy" (Cmnd 9542; para 6.34) 
However the White Paper issued the following 
caveat. 
"The Government is very concerned about the 
decline in traffic at Prestwick in recent 
years and the level of operating losses which 
have been experienced there. Every effort 
must therefore be made by those who want to 
preserve Prestwick to improve its economic 
performance, and the Government looks for a 
steady improvement in Prestwick's financial 
results. If this has not come by 1989 the 
policy will be reviewed." (Cmnd 9542: para 
6.35) 
The White Paper concludes by praising the 
facilities at Prestwick and suggesting that "its 
attractions should be increased by its designation 
as a freeport". An enquiry was promised "to 
examine the case for developing a station at the 
airport on the existing Glasgow-Ayr line" (ibid . 
para 6.36) 
Thus, Prestwick was allowed to retain its 
transatlantic monopoly. It is clear that the 
thinking underlying the 1982 Select Committee 
report had triumphed at least in part. The 
Government were prepared to give Prestwick time to 
see if the financial position could be turned 
around. Unfortunately,the Select Committee's other 
recommendations were either rejected or not 
addressed and its coherent package eschewed. 
In the remainder of this section we will examine 
the methodology of the review and seek to 
establish whether it did indeed pose serious 
environmental and social objections. The Ridley 
Review employed DCF techniques to compare a number 
of policy options following liberalisation of 
Scottish Lowlands policy. It was assumed that the 
vast majority of Prestwick's air transport 
movements would move either to Glasgow or 
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Edinburgh. The report then examined the 
profitability to BAA of various possible outcomes 
at Prestwick following this exodus. The review 
makes it very clear that "the runways at Glasgow 
and Edinburgh are shorter than Prestwick's and 
would impose some limitations on the payload which 
could be carried on larger aircraft. Most wide 
bodied aircraft types could take off for the 
American eastern seaboard with little or no 
penalty" (op cit: summary point (ix)). This 
analysis is based on use of large 4-engined 
aircraft such as the Boeing 747. The more 
efficient wide bodied twin engine aircraft such as 
the Airbus A300 and A310 and the Boeing 757 or 767 
were, as noted above, prevented from crossing the 
Atlantic. The report concedes that these would 
not impose the same penalties on carriers and 
would enhance the scope and attractiveness of 
Glasgow and Edinburgh as locations for 
transatlantic services. The fact that these 
aircraft are quieter and more fuel efficient than 
the older, heavier designs, was similarly 
acknowledged. 
A number of options were evaluated at 3 different 
levels of demand, (low, intermediate and high), 
for the period 1984-2010. However, only 2 cases 
were fully examined. 
(a) the status quo: all 3 Lowland Airports retain 
their present roles. 
(b) complete closure of Prestwick and the 
transference of business to Edinburgh and 
Glasgow. 
The review group assessed and dismissed various 
intermediate options which distributed charter and 
cargo flights to Prestwick. It was demonstrated 
that these would in all cases result in lower 
profitability to BAA than complete closure. 
Retaining the runway and a minimum level of 
service presented results which were "not in 
aggregate greatly worse than for the closure of 
Prestwick" (Ridley Review: para 29). However, 
such options were rejected on the grounds that 
such conclusions "disguise the very poor financial 
performance of Prestwick itself. The losses would 
be unacceptably high compared to a very low 
turnover". Thus although retaining the runway in 
some capacity presented near identical financial 
implications for the Lowland Airports as a group 
it was rejected on the basis of supplementary 
criteria. This arbitrary procedure is extremely 
significant in that it allowed the review to 
caution against change on the basis of "adverse 
but unquantifiable effects" on aviation related 
business and military movements at Prestwick. 
The Review Group generated its own traffic 
forecasts for both scenarios on the basis of 
different assumptions about traffic levels. In 
the case of Prestwick closure, a detailed 
evaluation of changing patterns of demand was 
undertaken. The major flaw in this procedure is 
that static nature of the analysis. Thus the 
report suggests that "the majority of traffic 
stimulation was expected to come from the 
diversion of traffic, which would have otherwise 
interlined over London to Glasgow and Edinburgh". 
(Ridley Review, Appendix 3; para 5). The change 
was not assumed to affect the growth path of the 
Scottish economy and thus many of the beneficial 
impacts argued to accompany change were not 
evaluated or incorporated in traffic forecast 
assumptions. The view that the change could 
induce faster economic growth in Scotland and thus 
feed back into higher demand for air travel was 
not incorporated into the analysis at any 
meaningful point. This accounts for the continued 
scepticism about the Review on the part of 
Scottish business and economic development 
interests. It should be noted that the Review was 
emphatic that none of Scotland's Lowland airports 
could develop as a major North European hub. The 
Report based this conclusion on the official view 
that, as Regional airports with a distinct local 
market, the Scottish system would never engender 
sufficient demand to justify the required network 
and frequency of services. On the basis of 
these traffic forecasts projections of revenues 
and costs were prepared for each of the two cases 
for the period 1987-2010. In both scenarios, 
charges at Glasgow were reduced to "produce 
reasonable rates of return on the assets involved" 
(ibid, para 99). As a result, the increased 
demand at Glasgow following redistribution 
resulted in additional reductions in user charges 
thus reducing the attractiveness of the 
entertained change to BAA. The incremental 
investment required to accommodate Prestwick's 
business at other Lowland sites was established 
for each projected traffic demand. The additional 
capital expenditure for the period 1985-2010 was 
valued at £10m, £14m and £18m (in 1984 prices) for 
the respective traffic forecasts. The 
calculations allow for the total elimination of 
planned investment at Prestwick over the period. 
It should be noted that the report concludes that 
if twin engined jets were to come into service on 
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these routes that the "capital investment need 
at Glasgow would be reduced", (ibid, para 66). 
The end point of this part of the analysis is a 
comparison of the NPV (net present value) to BAA 
of the closure option and the status quo for each 
level of demand. A negative NPV means that the 
capitalised income flows arising from the status 
quo are greater than those arising from the 
change. The report concludes that "the overall 
effect on BAA's financial results depends very 
much on the rate of traffic growth. If this is 
low, loss of revenue is more than offset by 
reduced costs so that the closure gives a positive 
NPV; with intermediate and high growth, the loss 
of income is greater and the costs saving lower, 
producing a negative NPV". (Ridley Review, para 
107). The deficit in the intermediate case was 
small (£3.9m). We take the view that the 
assumptions on revenues and expenditures seem to 
result in a certain bias in favour of the status 
quo. If these were allowed to vary marginally in 
the necessary direction then this would be 
eliminated. Only in the case of high demand are 
there clear benefits for BAA in retaining a fully 
functioning international airport at Prestwick. 
The review at no stage attempts to justify such an 
outcome and at times appears dismissive of it. 
The next stage was to establish the net effect on 
the airlines of the reduced charges implied in the 
above assumptions concerning revenue. When these 
are added we obtain a measure of the financial 
impact on the civil aviation industry. The 
transfers to airlines increase with the level of 
assumed traffic growth. The size of these 
transfers is governed by the adoption of an 
unspecified rate of return by BAA and consequent 
income reduction measures, and ranges between £28-
£35 million according to the assumed level of 
demand. This analysis signals quite clearly to 
airlines that there are financial benefits to the 
change in terms of reduced charges. This is 
before any consideration of the higher load 
factors which would accrue at the better central 
locations and which would increase expected 
revenue. Thus, the Review clarified the benefits 
of change for airlines. As the report notes, 
these are likely to be small in relation to the 
scale of costs evident in the airline business but 
may be significant for operators attempting to 
cater for the relatively thin Scottish market. 
The evaluation concludes by presenting the results 
of an appraisal of whether the resource costs of 
handling air traffic to and from Scotland would 
rise or fall following the closure for Prestwick. 
This is wide-ranging and includes an estimation 
of savings in passenger time and journey costs. 
Again the change is universally beneficial. 
The investment appraisal discussed above fails to 
settle the argument between the Glasgow and 
Prestwick supporters. It does not admit a key 
element in the case for change and yet concludes, 
given adverse assumptions, that change is 
universally beneficial to the Civil Aviation 
sector in Scotland, if not BAA, in the case of 
high growth in traffic. However, the Review 
whilst concluding that the benefits of change were 
"material" (ibid, pp 138) continued by arguing 
that "the case for changing Scottish Lowlands 
airport policy cannot be judged solely on the 
basis of financial and economic analysis". Other 
factors - social and political - may be judged 
important. As indicated earlier the Review, as 
remitted, next consider environmental, employment 
effects and site related activity. 
i) Employment Costs. The report provides 
estimates of the direct and indirect job losses 
of following the change of policy. Adjusting for 
personnel relocations and retirals, the increase 
in unemployment at or near the the Ayrshire site 
is estimated at 450-650. The review group were 
charged to consider "what would be the effect on 
employment of more services at Glasgow and 
Edinburgh, and of fewer at Prestwick" (Department 
of Transport (1984),para 14). It would be fair to 
conclude the report failed to make any formal 
allowance for offsetting employment benefits at 
the other Lowland sites. In its submission to the 
review process, Glasgow District Council attempted 
to quantify the direct and indirect employment 
effects of transference of activity to Glasgow. 
The Council estimated an immediate on-site impact 
of 1000 jobs which would support a further 1600 
jobs in airport related and other sectors, 
concluding that 
"a net employment gain of 2600 jobs would be 
directly attributable to the transfer of 
services from Prestwick (GDC (1984), para 
3.10). A quantification of the impact in the 
tourist sector concludes that "an additional 
1500 jobs might be generated in Glasgow, 
given the minimum attraction of a further 1-2 
million air tourists to Scotland" (ibid, para 
3.13). The submission also discussed the 
proposition that rationalised airport 
capacity was necessary, but not sufficient, 
64 
to improve the competitiveness of Glasgow in 
the market for mobile industrial, commercial 
and financial projects, although no attempt 
was made to quantify this aspect. In 
addition, by entertaining the closure of 
Prestwick as the sole alternative to change, 
the report avoided the requirement of 
assessing whether stimulation of other 
activity at Prestwick might prove possible. 
The Working Party therefore chose narrow criteria 
on which to base their conclusions on employment 
effects. The review indicates modest job losses 
in Ayrshire and having completely ignored 
offsetting spin-offs and induced effects qualifies 
its findings by suggesting that "total UK 
employment might well be lower in the short run , 
but over a longer period the various processes of 
adjustment should complete the re-allocation of 
resources. These adjustments would impose costs in 
the short term . But in the longer term the re-
allocation of resources would bring worthwhile 
gains to the economy as a whole"(Ridley 
Review, para 138). This is the only reference to 
the detailed case made by business and local 
authorities. 
In our view it is difficult to detect a sound 
argument against change on the basis of 
employment. Certainly, the Ridley Review failed 
to undertake the exercise properly. It is evident 
that a proper evaluation of the likely benefits 
would lead to a net gain in employment and a 
reduction in business costs following a change. 
ii) Site Related Activity: Since the runway is 
assumed to be closed, this builds up problems 
for existing users. However, given that retaining 
the runway would appear to engender very similar 
financial implications to complete closure, it is 
not clear that the alleged threat to jobs in 
adjacent plants and depots ought to be admitted as 
an argument against change. 
iii) Environmental: The report concludes that 
"the overall noise climate of Glasgow and 
Edinburgh should improve from 1986 mainly 
because of the withdrawal of the noisier 
types of aircraft from the UK register. But 
transfer of traffic from Prestwick would 
result in small increases in noise 
disturbance in comparison with maintenance of 
current policy." Thus, it is difficult to 
detect a sound environmental objection, even 
on the basis of the heavier and noisier jets 
which operated on transatlantic routes in 
1984. 
The most vociferous groups airing the 
environmental issue were residents from the 
prosperous Glasgow suburbs of Bearsden and 
Milngavie which lie beneath the flight path of 
Abbotsinch. If one accepts the wider development 
argument, then these people are amongst the most 
evident beneficiaries of change. If Glasgow 
develops as a financial and commercial centre , 
such middle class residents are likely to find 
increased opportunities and upward pressure on the 
price of quality housing. For the residents of 
less prosperous areas such as Knightswood, Yoker 
and Drumchapel, the offsetting benefits are less 
clear. We believe that this has conditioned 
responses to possible changes in Lowlands policy 
on the part of political and community groups in 
Glasgow. These bodies appear unenthusiastic or 
ambiguous about the planned development of the 
City and view the issues as remote and irrelevant 
to the bulk of the Glasgow labour force. This 
issue graphically illustrates that Glasgow's urban 
regeneration strategies have yet to convince the 
City's residents. This requires to be addressed. 
The Ridley Review can be viewed as a flawed 
document which failed to comprehensively determine 
the exact costs and benefits of change through a 
process of ignoring the relevant issues. For this 
reason, Stevens (1985) argued that the decision 
based upon the Review " changed little and solved 
nothing" (p64). The review demonstrates that 
change is attainable without major capital 
expenditure and clearly signals the benefits to 
airlines and consumers. The Review concludes that 
reform of Lowlands policy is feasible and 
emphasises that the situation has changed since 
1978. On the basis of likely states of the world, 
the change is neutral or beneficial to all the 
main players in the civil aviation sector. The 
ancillary issues of noise, employment and site-
related activity do not weaken the clarity of the 
case for change and if properly analysed would 
not militate against the removal of Prestwick's 
transatlantic monopoly. 
Early criticisms of the Review prompted a 
spirited defence of the policy by Government 
Ministers. Mr Nicholas Ridley suggested that "our 
proposals give Prestwick a new opportunity to 
thrive". Mr George Younger, then Scottish 
Secretary, argued that "there is no reason why 
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Prestwick cannot have a rosy future", and 
concluded that 
"we now have a blueprint for development and 
for airport policy for a long time ahead. Now 
that a lengthy period of uncertainty is over, 
let us get on with the job of talking up 
Prestwick for the good of everyone." 
Stevens (ibid, p66) rejected such thinking as 
"fundamentally wrong" , arguing that "it is our 
view that "uncertainty" is not at the root of 
Prestwick's trouble and that "talking Prestwick 
up" has not succeeded and is unlikely to have a 
material impact on the fortunes of Scotland's 
transatlantic gateway." This analysis stresses the 
unworkability of a policy seeking to segment 
demand and concludes that Prestwick faces and 
will continue to face competition from Glasgow 
and Edinburgh for transatlantic services. The 
paper further notes that the policy of seeking 
liberalisation will tend to favour centres whose 
interlining opportunities present the prospect of 
higher load factors. Stevens argues that it is not 
possible to develop this activity at Prestwick 
because facilities already exist at the other, 
more conveniently located airports in Central 
Scotland and are unlikely to be profitably 
duplicated on a third site. 
On this view, the traffic distribution 
arrangements imply that Prestwick will remain an 
air transport cul-de-sac with few feeder services 
and limited growth potential. The favoured 
configuration does not allow the government to 
attain it's airports objectives in Scotland and 
essentially thwarts the maximisation of direct 
transatlantic flights. It is not possible in 
liberalised air transport markets to insist on 
complementary roles and thus Stevens (1985) 
concludes that 
"Prestwick is a casualty of the very market 
forces which the government is committed to 
encouraging. The Government is committed to 
creating a world where Prestwick airport 
has little future" (ibid, p66). 
5. CHANGING PERSPECTIVES 1986-1989 
The dissatisfaction with the scope and methodology 
of the 1985 Review and the resultant Government 
decision did not abate. In Glasgow, the Evening 
Times newspaper began a sustained campaign 
designed to illustrate the costs and fallacies of 
lowlands policy and press for "gateway" status for 
Glasgow airport. In October 1986, Glasgow Lord 
Provost, Robert Gray and Council Leader, Mr Pat 
Lally, convened a Glasgow Airport Working Party. 
The purpose of this group was to lobby for an 
"open skies" policy in Central Scotland. 
Following an unpromising correspondence with the 
Scottish Secretary, Mr Malcolm Rifkind, the 
Working Party agreed to commission an independent 
review. A study brief was prepared and tenders 
invited from a large list of prestigious academic 
and private sector consultants. The issues to be 
explored were fourfold. First, to examine the 
exact circumstances of the lowlands system, 
establish its performance and future prospects, 
and assess whether it was justified or feasible to 
widen the roles of Glasgow and Edinburgh. Second, 
to quantify the full range of short and long term 
costs and benefits which would accrue following 
redesignation of Glasgow to "gateway" status. 
Third, to establish "the implications of Prestwick 
should 'gateway' status be transferred, developing 
alternative scenarios for the airport and 
indicating any adjustment processes which may have 
to be undergone" (GDC (1986) para 3). It should 
be stressed that the clear motivation was to 
establish a viable development strategy for the 
Prestwick Airport site and to identify the 
resources required to support perceived 
opportunities. Fourth, to assess the likely 
development of the lowlands system given the 
advent of an open skies policy in Central 
Scotland. 
This study sought to remedy the widely held view 
that the 1985 Review had failed to address the 
issue in a coherent and systematic fashion. In 
the event, this study was not undertaken. As 
indicated above, the Scottish Office refused to 
entertain any discussion of change, and in 
correspondence with the Working Party reiterated 
the view that "it was in the best interests for 
Scotland as a whole that the existing traffic 
distribution system, within which the Scottish 
airports hold complementary roles, should continue 
and that Prestwick should be given a reasonable 
period - until 1989 - to improve its financial 
performance." Scottish Office (1986). In further 
correspondence, the Scottish Secretary argued that 
"Scotland's interests are best served by allowing 
Prestwick an opportunity, free from uncertainty, 
to improve its financial position." Scottish 
Office (1987). Thus, the Scottish Office 
continued to hold what a growing body of opinion 
regarded as a seriously flawed and discredited 
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view of the world. Given this and the imminent 
privatisation of BAA, the Working Party 
regretfully concluded that there was little point 
in committing funds to a project which could not 
hope to engender any substantive change in policy. 
A short time later, this group fragmented. 
The objectives of this group were not to further 
blindly the interests of Glasgow Airport. The 
motivation was to obtain programmes and policies 
based upon a realistic analysis of the position 
and prospects for Scottish civil aviation. The 
overwhelming concern of participants was that the 
government's position was hampering agreed 
regeneration strategies across the whole Central 
Belt. The collapse in oil prices in the mid 
1980's provoked contractionary pressures in 
Scotland which were more evident than in other UK 
regions. This contributed to an intensification 
of effort to attract mobile projects of every type 
and to stimulate small and medium businesses 
through a programme of advice, financial incentive 
and property provision. As time passed, concern 
emerged that Scotland has not been performing 
well. Anxiety in Scotland was heightened by a 
series of developments. The Delors proposals and 
the imminent liberalisation of product markets 
across the EC, in conjunction with the 
construction of the Channel Tunnel, focused 
attention upon the peripheral location of Scotland 
within this block. A series of changes to 
Regional Policy instruments and widely reported 
skirmishes over the role and effectiveness of the 
SDA contributed to a perception that policy was 
failing to measure up to the threats and 
opportunities facing Scotland. In recent years, 
issues relating to the long-run competitiveness of 
Scotland as a location for organising and 
conducting economic activity have become a 
pervasive influence upon Scottish public affairs. 
Criticisms of the direction, cohesiveness and 
control of the economic development function 
provoked the Hughes Plan and subsequent Scottish 
Enterprise measures. There continues to be 
considerable debate as to whether what will emerge 
will be appropriate for the task. However, there 
is also a keen focus upon other public programmes 
and agencies involved in the provision of 
infrastructure to support broad development 
objectives. In particular, great emphasis has 
been placed upon transport issues and the need to 
develop suitable connections to Scotland's major 
UK and international markets. This has manifested 
itself in sustained calls to substantially upgrade 
road and rail links to the South and the Channel 
Tunnel, and to contemplate measures to engender a 
wider set of direct air connections to Scotland. 
Thus, the wish to reappraise lowland airport 
policy is now firmly grounded in a wider set of 
economic development issues. 
The strategic importance of airports underlies the 
widespread preoccupation concerning the growth and 
development of Manchester International Airport. 
Manchester Airport has an estimated catchment area 
of 18-20 million people and continues to expand in 
terms of range of services and airport activity 
measures as it increases it's penetration of North 
and Midlands markets. It is also seeking to 
develop as a major North European hub and has 
medium term expenditure plans to provide terminal 
capacity of 23 million passengers per annum by the 
end of the century. These proposals are 
explicitly part of a coherent set of measures 
designed to further development in the North West. 
A document published by the City of Manchester 
Planning Department (CMPD (1986)), sets out the 
perceived role and economic impact of the airport 
in both a regional and national context. The view 
of development interests in the North West is that 
"air services may not be sufficient in themselves 
to promote economic revival, but they nonetheless 
form an important component in any strategy to 
rejuvenate the northern economies." (CMPD (1986) 
para 2). The airport is viewed as being capable 
of inducing employment through an enhancement of 
the area's perceived locational advantages and its 
ongoing expansion is resourced on that basis. 
Thus, the 1987/88 Annual Report explains that "new 
initiatives were taken to broaden the company's 
base, these recognised that Manchester Airport 
pic is involved in more than the air transport 
business. In co-operation with industrial and 
commercial organisations, both public and private, 
vigorous promotion of the airport was undertaken 
over a wide area. The presence of a large, 
efficient airport with links throughout the world 
is a potent lure for industrialists and 
entrepreneurs seeking new sites for development 
and expansion." (pp 19). In the view of the 
Chairman, the airport "plays a major role in the 
economy and its capacity for improving the 
region's economic performance increases all the 
time." (ibid pp 3). 
Scotland and other UK regions compete for the 
existing flow of mobile investment projects. The 
issue with respect to airports is whether the 
policy regime encourages the maximisation of 
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services in each respective area. As set out in 
part 3, location decisions depend on a range of 
factors. The concern that the supply of air 
services was a weak element in the Scottish 
"package" gained ground over the decade. 
Manchester appears to be making the most of the 
opportunities which designation as a Category A 
airport provides. The convoluted traffic 
distribution rules in Scotland are argued to 
prevent Scotland from doing likewise. There is no 
widespread belief that air transport in Scotland 
can develop on the same scale as Manchester. 
However, there is a belief that lowland airports 
policy prevents Scotland from using its resources 
in this area to maximum effect. In our view, the 
progress evident in the North West served both to 
define the issues and compound the existing 
frustrations. 
Hence, during the 1980's, airports policy was 
progressively undermined by the perceived 
exigencies of economic regeneration policies. 
Over the decade, attitudes have hardened as the 
issues became more widely understood and accepted, 
and as a possible 1989 review of policy beckoned, 
Prestwick Airport had few friends in industrial 
and economic development circles. However, 
attitudes and resolve in Ayrshire have also been 
stiffened by events. In the past decade, Ayrshire 
has experienced considerable job losses in 
chemicals, iron and steel, coal, textiles and 
engineering. As in all other areas, public 
agencies and local authorities, in partnership 
with the private sector are attempting to attract 
or foster business and industry to offset these 
adverse trends. It is our view that the 
resistance on the part of Ayrshire interests to 
changes in lowland airports policy is ultimately 
grounded upon a wider set of fears about the 
Ayrshire economy and its prospects. 
In the 1970's, Ayrshire seemed set to benefit from 
major developments at the Hunterston Peninsula and 
from the ongoing expansion of Irvine New Town. 
However, in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the 
former county experienced a number of large and 
high-profile closures and retrenchments. By 1981, 
Ayrshire accounted for 13.6% of employment within 
Strathclyde Region. Table 3 presents data on 
employment and notified redundancies for the 
period 1981 to 1984. In our view, Ayrshire and 
Lanarkshire present the most relevant contrast. 
In 1981, both exhibited equivalent proportions of 
manufacturing and service activity. In addition, 
they are similarly positioned relative to the 
declining urban centre and both possess large 
rural hinterlands. Over the period, Ayrshire 
experienced notified redundancies in line with its 
share of employment. Both Lanarkshire and 
Inverclyde exhibited a greater proportion of 
redundancies than might be expected on this basis. 
Whilst it should be noted that notified 
redundancies are an imprecise guide to job losses, 
these figures suggest that Ayrshire is performing 
well relative to Lanarkshire and certain other 
areas. In the event, employment in Ayrshire 
declined by 6.8%. This trend conceals a smaller 
decline in manufacturing activity than in 
Strathclyde Region as a whole. Indeed, Ayrshire 
held onto a greater proportion of its 
manufacturing jobs than all the TTWA's under 
discussion. However, its performance in services 
was conspicuously poor. Employment in services 
declined by 5.6%. This contrasts with growth of 
2.8% in Lanarkshire and 5.1% in the outer rim of 
the Glasgow conurbation, and a fall of 1.8% when 
the City is included. Ayrshire also recorded less 
than average falls in male employment with only 
Glasgow's outer rim performing better. However, 
Ayrshire lost a higher proportion of female jobs 
than any other TTWA. In contrast, female 
employment in Lanarkshire increased by 4.2% in 
this period. 
This data is consistent with the view that 
Lanarkshire and parts of the Glasgow concentration 
out-performed Ayrshire in terms of retaining or 
engendering employment in the period 1981-84. In 
particular, it is probable that Lanarkshire lost 
jobs at a faster rate than Ayrshire, but was more 
adept at diversifying into other activity. 
Although Ayrshire experienced a smaller net loss 
of manufacturing employment, it failed to foster 
service sector growth and hence performed poorly. 
Within Ayrshire, Cunninghame and Kyle and Carrick 
performed better than the Region as a whole, and 
Kilmarnock and Cumnock significantly worse. 
In 1984, the Irvine TTWA exhibited the highest 
unemployment rate of any TTWA in the UK. The 
Cumnock TTWA ranked second in Scotland and sixth 
in the UK. Use of disaggregated data published by 
Strathclyde Regional Council permits the setting 
aside the city of Glasgow and allows one to 
concentrate on the towns and cities surrounding 
the conurbation. On this basis we find that, in 
1984, Ayrshire communities account for 4 of the 5 
worst areas in terms of male unemployment and 3 of 
the 5 worst in terms of female unemployment. It 
is not surprising, given its poor performance in 
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sustaining female employment, that Ayrshire towns 
account for 5 of the worst 10 communities in terms 
of female unemployment with a rural dimension 
emerging in the Maybole and Girvan areas. Despite 
new town status, Irvine remained the 4th worst 
town in terms of male and total unemployment and 
was conspicuously failing to match the performance 
of East Kilbride and Cumbernauld in terms of 
retaining and expanding employment. 
The view that Ayrshire was doing relatively worse 
than other parts of non-urban Strathclyde began to 
emerge in the mid 1980's and focused attention on 
surface transport. Internally, Ayrshire possesses 
an excellent set of roads. However, these were 
and remain poorly connected to the rest of the 
Stratbclyde road system and national motorway 
network. Thus, as concern grew over Scotland's 
attractiveness as a location, a preoccupation with 
the relative attractiveness of Ayrshire as a 
location within Scotland emerged in tandem. In 
particular, delays in upgrading the A77 and A737 
over the entire decade have reinforced the view 
that Ayrshire remains a less attractive place to 
locate or expand than Lanarkshire, and Irvine less 
well positioned than East Kilbride or Cumbernauld. 
The period 1984-86 saw Ayrshire performing better 
than the Regional average in terms of unemployment 
reduction. Numbers unemployed fell slightly in 
both Ayrshire and Lanarkshire and rose in other 
TTWA's. Unemployment data has been subject to 
continuing revision and changes in numbers 
unemployed are a sketchy indication of how an area 
is performing. An area could engender a net 
creation of jobs and face rising or stagnant 
unemployment rates because of a faster growing 
labour supply. In addition, the notion of a TTWA 
which implies minimum flows of workers across the 
boundary seems to have lost some force within 
Strathclyde during the latter part of the decade. 
Thus, the line from changes in numbers unemployed 
to the employment performance of an area is not a 
clear one. In the period 1986-88, notified 
redundancies in Ayrshire occurred in the same 
proportion as its share in the Region's 
employment. Again, Lanarkshire fared worse than 
expected as did Glasgow's outer rim. Between 1986 
and 1988, Ayrshire accounted for 26.5Z of regional 
assistance within Strathclyde, implying a better 
rate of manufacturing job creation than in other 
areas. Thus, there is tenuous evidence that 
Ayrshire's relative performance has improved since 
the middle of the decade. In the period 1986-
1988, Ayrshire experienced percentage falls in 
numbers unemployed above the regional average for 
both male and female categories. However, on this 
measure, Lanarkshire is still out-performing 
Ayrshire which is doing only marginally better 
than the non-city rim of the Glasgow TTWA. At the 
end of 1988, Ayrshire still accounted for 3 of 5 
worst affected communities outside Glasgow in 
terms of male unemployment, and 4 of the top 5 in 
terms of female unemployment. In this latter 
respect, Ayrshire accounted for 7 of the 10 worst 
areas. "Improvement" has been most evident in 
North Ayrshire. Irvine New Town has improved its 
relative position but remains one of the worst 10 
communities in terms of both total and male 
unemployment. It remains marginally worse than the 
major old industrial centres in Renfrew and 
Lanarkshire and significantly worse than either 
East Kilbride or Cumbernauld. 
Thus, on some criteria, there is limited evidence 
that parts of Ayrshire are doing relatively better 
than in 1980-84. However, the coastal towns of 
Ardrossan, Saltcoats and Stevenston and the former 
mining area based around Cumnock remain major non-
urban employment black spots. Analysis of 
Regional and District seat data reveals 
significant concentrations of unemployed in parts 
of the 3 large Ayrshire towns of Irvine, 
Kilmarnock and Ayr. It would appear that the job 
creation effort in the area and the likely 
increased incidence of commuting to the Glasgow 
TTWA is having an effect on unemployment rates. 
However, the scale and pattern of labour demand 
has tended to benefit Ayrshire communities 
differentially. Thus, although Ayrshire may be 
doing better at reducing its unemployment queues 
than previously, the benefit remains to be felt in 
certain localities characterised by a largely 
unskilled workforce and a heavy concentration of 
long-term unemployed. These remain prominent and 
visible black spots exhibiting a range of worrying 
social trends and detracting from whatever else 
has been achieved in terms of building up business 
and employment. 
Concerns about the future of Prestwick Airport and 
consequent job losses gel with these wider 
concerns. The notion that Ayrshire has yet to get 
to grips with the adverse implications of previous 
industrial contraction is widespread. This is 
allied to the view that Government and Strathclyde 
Regional Council have failed to invest in the 
basic infrastructure required to accommodate job 
creation and engender locational advantage. In 
addition, Glasgow and Lanarkshire appear to have 
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better resourced and co-ordinated development 
strategies whilst the effort in Ayrshire is seen 
as fragmented and non-cohesive. The loss of the 
transatlantic gateway role is viewed as further 
evidence of the uncompetiveness of Ayrshire as a 
location for organising economic activity. This 
would create adverse impacts that cannot be easily 
accommodated. For these reasons, attempts to 
amend the air traffic distribution rules continue 
to be met with clear and well organised 
resistance. 
Thus, since the last review, attitudes on both 
sides of the issue have hardened. In both cases, 
the fundamental concern is one of economic 
regeneration. There is a clear stand of opinion 
which argues that it is necessary but not 
sufficient for Scottish development to restructure 
the supply of air services. 
The end point of this exercise is to improve the 
perception of Scotland as an industrial and 
commercial location and thus facilitate faster 
economic growth. However, the greater awareness 
of Scotland's need to provide a competitive 
locational package has been accompanied by concern 
about the competitiveness of locations within 
Scotland. In this respect, there is a view, 
substantiated by available evidence, that Ayrshire 
has coped less well with the upheavals of the late 
1970s and 1980s than other locations. Thus, 
Ayrshire is not seen as well placed to absorb the 
alleged employment consequences of changing 
lowlands policy. The airports issue can be 
construed as the focal point for wider 
anxieties about where Ayrshire is going in the 
1990's and what is required to engender 
improvements in the competitiveness of the area. 
Lanarkshire is viewed to have out-performed 
Ayrshire partly because of its location at the 
head of the main trunk road to the South. 
Emphasis in Ayrshire is on enhancing the areas 
prospects through strategic investments in roads, 
thus eliminating the perception that the area is a 
remote location in Scottish terms. These requests 
have fallen on deaf ears. Thus, if a change in 
airports policy is necessary to enhance national, 
regional and urban strategies and facilitate 
faster development, it is not surprising that 
there is hostility in Ayrshire given that the 
former county perceives itself and is perceived to 
be relatively poorly located and unlikely to 
derive the same degree of positive benefit from 
the change. 
6. THE 1989 REVIEW 
In January 1989, the Chairman of BAA, Sir Norman 
Payne, wrote to the Transport Secretary requesting 
that a review of lowlands policy be undertaken. In 
this statement BAA argued that 
"although Prestwick Airport's financial 
position is not good, this is not the main 
reason for calling for the review. In spite 
of all the magnificent effort by BAA staff 
and others to make it a success, Prestwick 
would appear not to have established itself 
with the air transport industry or with the 
Scottish community as a future gateway for 
Scotland." 
The statement concluded that 
"a review is necessary to determine whether 
current policy is best for Scotland, and 
should be carried out as soon as possible to 
end the uncertainty inherent in the present 
situation." (BAA (1989)) 
This statement provoked a considerable reaction in 
Scottish circles and led to the reconstitution of 
various pressure groups intent on lobbying 
Government on one or other aspect of the airports 
issue. A prolonged and heated public debate ensued 
during which many of the salient issues were 
ventilated. In May 1989 the Transport Secretary 
announced that no review was called for. In a 
supplementary statement The Scottish Secretary re-
iterated the view that Prestwick could succeed in 
its transatlantic gateway role and announced 
urgent discussions with interested parties to 
consider the upgrading of road and rail facilities 
at the airport. It should be noted that this 
urgency emerged a full 8 years after these 
measures had been recommended by the Select 
Committee on Scottish Affairs and 4 years after 
the Government had endorsed such provision in the 
1985 White Paper. 
The decision to sustain Prestwick's transatlantic 
monopoly provoked a furious reaction within the 
airline industry and Scottish business community. 
During the parliamentary recess, a concerted 
attempt took place to change this decision. One 
airline, Air 2000, pressed on with a court action 
concerning the traffic distribution rules whilst 
another, United Airlines, made application to the 
US authorities for a licence to operate between 
Glasgow and two US destinations. Other carriers 
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made it known that, whilst they regarded Prestwick 
as unsuitable, operations from Glasgow would merit 
serious consideration. The Scottish business 
community made representations at the highest 
level with the case for a review being aired with 
considerable force. In September 1989 the 
Government bowed to this pressure and announced a 
that a 'short sharp review' was to be commissioned 
and the Department of Transport has subsequently 
issued a consultative document, (DT (1989)). The 
document was issued on the 28th of September and 
calls for submissions to be addressed to the 
Department of Transport by 29th November 1989. 
Copies of submissions should also be sent to the 
Scottish Office although their role in the 
decision making process is not specified. The 
document sets out that 
"the aim of the review is to determine 
whether the Government should maintain a 
special policy in relation to Scottish 
Airports or adopt the less restrictive 
approach which applies more generally in the 
UK." (op cit, para 1) 
The document next embarks on what we view to be a 
mildly worrying course. The "long-standing 
Scottish Lowland Airports policy" is briefly set 
out and the nature of the "special permission" 
under which certain charter services currently use 
Glasgow and Edinburgh is outlined. The document 
next complains that "what had been envisaged as a 
concession, permitting Prestwick flights to serve 
the other two Lowland Airports if needed, was now 
represented as a bureaucratic additional 
requirement."(ibid,para4) The document then 
proceeds by demonstrating the importance to the 
Department of Transport of being empowered to 
effect traffic distribution rules for Scotland and 
outlines two broad policy options. 
"(a) adopt a market driven policy whereby, 
subject to the licences they hold, 
international air service agreements, 
and to the physical capabilities of the 
airports, airlines can fly directly to 
and from whichever Scottish Lowland 
Airport best suits their and their 
customers needs; 
or 
(b) re-establish Prestwick as the sole 
Lowland Airport open to long haul 
intercontinental services, banning such 
flights to or from Edinburgh and 
Glasgow, irrespective of them stopping 
at Prestwick en route." (ibid, para 8) 
Few people in Scotland would deny that an elected 
UK government has the right to determine policy 
and construct whatever distribution rules they see 
fit. The issue is how these rules stand in 
relation to other policy objectives. Thus, it is 
valid to ask whether the "long-standing" lowland 
policy facilitates the attainment of the goals of 
Gateway International Airports which are "to 
provide a wide range and frequency of 
international services including intei—continental 
services." (Cmnd 9542, para 6.25) In addition, we 
argue above that Scotland's airports are 
essentially regional airports. As was set out in 
Section 2, regional airports are obliged by 
Government to "meet the maximum demand they can 
attract" and to play a role in relieving pressure 
on capacity in the South-East." (ibid, paras 
3.1,6.1) In this light, it is legitimate to 
enquire whether splitting a Gateway airport over 
two sites allows these objectives to be attained 
and whether this actually does result in 
complementary roles for lowlands airports. Our 
analysis suggests that there are clear grounds for 
doubt. Thus we are disappointed that the 
Department of Transport have not asked, directly 
and explicitly, for observations on whether the 
"long-standing Scottish Lowlands Airports policy" 
actually works. 
Complaints of opportunism concerning the 
exploitation of the concessions to other lowland 
sites indicate a strange understanding of the more 
liberal air transport environment which Government 
has been intent in promoting. In particular, this 
does not sit well with the pressures such a regime 
imposes on carriers. In Section 2, we set out the 
central role that Government accords to the 
commercial decisions of airlines whilst in Section 
3 we indicated the prominent role that carriers 
have played in challenging the view that Glasgow 
and Edinburgh could not house transatlantic 
flights because of alleged infrastructure costs 
and revenue penalties. In Section 4 we outlined 
how the 1985 review finally accepted that these 
arguments were discredited and clarified the 
benefits to the airline industry of changing the 
status quo. In liberalised air transport markets, 
private risk-takers commit capital to the purchase 
of aircraft in order to sell air services to 
consumers. These agents will naturally wish to 
operate in the circumstances in which they can 
maximise profits. Indeed, the Government endorses 
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such commercial decisions as the determining 
factor in the growth of regional airports. In the 
more liberal world that Government seeks to 
engender, restrictions and traffic distribution 
rules become both unpopular and untenable in the 
eyes of entrepreneurs and airline executives when 
they imply that carriers must operate less 
profitably than might otherwise be the case. The 
1985 review sent clear signals to agents that 
there were economic and financial benefits 
accompanying change and it should surprise no one 
that profit maximising risk takers seek every 
means of securing a more advantageous set of 
circumstances. We regard such outcomes as an 
inevitable reaction to measures which run contrary 
to the grain of the market situation. 
A further indication that Government may be 
failing to appreciate the implications of their 
general liberal stance for Scotland is contained 
in "the conditions identified as the trigger for 
a review".(DT (1989), para 6) In this passage, 
Government refers to the 1985 White Paper and the 
caveat that Prestwick's performance required to 
improve by 1989. It concludes that the performance 
of Prestwick had improved sufficiently to persuade 
Government to continue with the existing policy. 
We suggest that the financial performance of 
Prestwick is wholly irrelevant to the considerable 
number of airlines who hold licences to operate at 
that airport and have insisted that they have no 
intention of operating on that basis. The key 
issue is not of whether Prestwick's performance 
has improved. Given present trends it may well be 
possible to nudge the airport into the black. The 
main emphasis should be on whether free enterprise 
carriers would provide a greater level of service 
and so satisfy the broader goals of airports 
policy. If the airport, as part of the Scottish 
system, cannot attract to Scotland the maximum 
feasible range of transatlantic services because 
carriers do not foresee sufficient returns then we 
would argue the system is failing to serve 
Scotland's needs and interests in a much wider 
sense. In effect. Government do not have two 
options. The choice lies between a "market driven" 
approach which is in line with the philosophy of 
current air transport policy and the re-imposition 
of controls and limitations which is contrary to 
the stance taken in this and other areas. The 
scope of the consultative exercise is sufficient 
to allow this conclusion to be demonstrated. 
The consultation document set out that 
"given the breadth of opinion in Scotland on 
the existing policy, the Secretary of State 
thinks it important first to establish by a 
more general consultation whether there are 
strong arguments for a less directive 
policy".(op cit, para 7) 
The document outlines five broad areas on which 
the Secretary of State "would find comment 
particularly valuable."(ibid, para 9) These are 
the effect on the Scottish economy, the effect on 
the consumer, environmental implications, the 
effect on airports and the effect on airlines. It 
is up to Scottish interests and institutions to 
set out clearly the benefits of change and the 
costs of maintaining the status quo. We conclude 
this section by highlighting the issues which 
appear important in this respect. This will serve 
both as a summation of the argument set out in 
earlier sections and provide a guide to how 
certain factors have changed since the last 
review. 
(i) The effect on airlines The consultative 
document sets out that " the Secretary of 
State is keen to see how airlines envisage 
future services at the three airports under 
the two broad options mentioned, what 
advantages or disadvantages they perceive in 
operating from each of the airports ,(eg 
interlining) and how they see the options 
fitting in with their existing/potential 
operations elsewhere in the UK." (ibid, para 
14) 
In general terms, it can be confidently 
expected that airlines will be favourably 
disposed towards a reform of lowland policy. 
The major implication of our analysis is that 
some proportion of current Anglo-Scottish 
business will be diverted to direct 
transatlantic flights which fulfils the 
objectives set for both Gateway and regional 
airports. However, both the current operators 
on that route seem intent on operating 
transatlantic services from Glasgow. The 
numbers of Scottish transatlantic passengers 
interlining at other hubs is small and should 
not penalise the short haul European services 
significantly. The logic of liberalisation 
would suggest that these factors should not be 
relevant. If a new competitive situation opens 
up, substitution effects will be based on 
consumers rational preferences. Thus, if 
consumers change behaviour it will be because 
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it is perceived to increase utility. A liberal 
approach is grounded upon notions of consumer 
sovereignty. However, Mr Parkinson is obliged 
to consider the broader UK interest. 
The passage makes oblique reference to a range 
of issues which are the proper concern of the 
Transport Ministry. The use of the phrase 
"existing/potential operations" may relate to 
the current re-negotiation of the Bermuda 2 
ASA. The existing agreement precludes US 
airlines serving Manchester and other regional 
centres. The improvements in aircraft 
technology set out above transform the 
prospects for other regional airports such as 
Birmingham which has long cherished Gateway 
Status. The UK is seeking 'onward carrier 
rights' which would allow UK airlines greater 
access to the US market. The Secretary of 
State will be concerned with what notified 
developments might imply for the these 
negotiations and for UK civil aviation 
interests. Civil Aviation is traditionally a 
sector which exhibits a positive trade 
balance. In recent years, the net earnings 
made by overseas carriers in the UK market 
have been growing more rapidly than the net 
flow to the UK sector derived from overseas 
activity. In consequence, the overall balance 
in the civil aviation sector has moved into 
the red by £414m in 1986 and £494m in 1987. 
The Transport Minister is duty bound to 
reflect upon how the fluid situation in the 
North American market is likely to be resolved 
and establish the implications for UK 
interests. 
US carriers are permitted to serve Scotland. 
Thus, we do not detect any substantial 
concession to US interests following a change 
in Lowland policy. However, the opening up of 
Manchester and Birmingham would reduce demand 
in the congested South-East through affording 
passengers in this catchment less resource 
intensive journeys. The difficulty for the 
Ministry of Transport relates to the 
competitive advantage conferred on US carriers 
in this event. These airports would act as 
spokes in the hub systems at major US 
airports. Long haul carriers at these hubs are 
well entrenched and typically provide a strong 
short haul network on which to base the 
marketing of inter-continental services. This 
implies the existence of a strong core 
business which would govern the level and 
frequency of profitable service. The Transport 
Ministry correctly questions whether this 
affords too strong a position to US carriers 
in terms of these relatively thin markets. UK 
airlines do not have the same scale of 
domestic market potential. Although Manchester 
affects to be a North European hub, the 
European market is characterised by a 
multitude of North American entry points, a 
procession of national carriers operating from 
domestic hubs and the requisite number of 
separate ASA's. UK operators seeking to build 
up interlining business at Manchester face a 
fundamentally more difficult task than US 
carriers who operate in a single domestic 
market. Thus, the Transport Ministry has 
correctly and properly refused to open up 
English regional centres without some redress 
of the demonstrable competitive imbalance in 
the form of greater access to the US market by 
UK carriers. 
If these issues are resolved, Manchester will 
tend to become relatively more attractive 
within it's catchment as the range and 
frequency of US services increases. UAL Vice 
President, Mr David Coltman, in launching a 
bid for licences from Glasgow to two major US 
hubs, stressed the benefits to the Midlands 
market of interlining at Glasgow as compared 
with the the journey via the congested South-
East system or the drive to Manchester. This 
is based upon UAL's ability to offer a multi 
stage trip to any major US destination and 
implies considerable marketing effort in 
Midlands markets. The further liberalisation 
of the English regions would circumscribe the 
ability of the Scottish system to compete in 
this catchment. However, the view presented in 
this paper is not based on grandiose 
assumptions about interlining activity. The 
argument remains that, given the demand in the 
Scottish market, the broader Scottish economic 
interest dictates a requirement to maximise 
the level of direct services in order to 
accomodate existing urban and regional 
programmes and industrial strategies. 
Interlining effects would constitute a bonus 
to the Scottish system. 
It would serve Scotland's interests 
particularly well to be part of UAL's emerging 
global network and it is fortunate that the 
existing Bermuda 2 agreement affords this 
possibility without wider implications. At 
73 
present, North American carriers dominate the 
Scottish transatlantic market. A policy of 
fewer restrictions would engender a strong 
British presence where none exists currently. 
BA have made it evident that they intend to 
operate from Glasgow and independents have 
shown interest. The exact situation vis-a-vis 
BA and UAL depends on whether BA succeeds in 
gaining a 15% stake in the control of the 
company. In this situation it is reasonable to 
conclude that there would be competitive 
implications in these two related carriers 
operating in this relatively thin market. It 
can be suggested that BA might wish to operate 
the long haul spokes into UAL's extensive hub 
networks. 
We view that there are no major implications 
for wider UK civil aviation interests in 
altering Lowland policy. However the 
conclusions of the Bermuda 2 negotiations and 
the proposed BA-UAL tie-up present modest 
implications for the nature of the services 
which may emerge. The argument over whether 
significant hub effects may or may not result 
is not central to the wider case for reform. 
The proposed change is certain to engender a 
UK presence in a market dominated by North 
American carriers. A careful examination the 
change in passenger flows may indicate a 
slight but favourable effect on the balance of 
trade in the civil aviation sector. Carriers 
wish the opportunity of cultivating the 
Scottish market from Edinburgh and Glasgow. It 
would be inconsistent with the other 
objectives and underlying philosophy of UK air 
transport policy to deny such overtures. 
(ii) The effect on airports The consultative 
document sets out that "the practical 
capability of the airports to handle long haul 
intei—continental traffic will be a factor in 
the speed with which any change in policy 
might take effect. There would also be 
investment and employment consequences for BAA 
and others, both at the airport and in its 
immediate vicinity. The Secretary of State 
will also wish to have advice on these matters 
including a summary of the present and 
possible future situation on terminals, runway 
capacity and air traffic control, together 
with estimates of demand capacity and 
financial implications."(op cit, para 13) 
This passage may be seen by some as an 
opportunity to admit into evidence the 
discredited view of inflated infrastructural 
requirements at other sites and runway 
enforced penalties on revenue in the event of 
change. In section 4, we conclude that there 
have been no such major implications for over 
ten years. Although it is for BAA to comment 
fully, the current expenditure implications in 
terms of Glasgow appear minimal. BAA currently 
plan a major expansion in Glasgow's terminal 
capacity on the basis of its present short 
haul role. The marginal cost of incorporating 
a largely twin engine transatlantic service is 
likely to prove small given the popularity of 
this technology on short haul routes. A 
strong case exists for providing a rail link 
to Glasgow Airport which is justified without 
reference to changes in Lowland policy. We 
expect that it will prove impossible to argue 
against change on the basis of additional 
infrastructural requirements. In addition, 
unemployed land and labour is manifest around 
Abbotsinch and there are no evident 
constraints in accommodating possible spin-
offs. We will refer further to such matters in 
the discussion of the effect on the Scottish 
economy. 
Since requesting a review, BAA have stressed 
consistently that the runway at Prestwick will 
remain operational to support the burgeoning 
non passenger activity. The critical issue 
relates to whether the terminal can be 
utilised. The outlook for air transport has 
improved considerably since the 1985 review. 
Table 4 compares the latest BAA forecasts of 
Scottish demand with those which underpinned 
the analysis of the Ridley Review. This data 
indicates that the 1984 forecasts have tuned 
out to be pessimistic. This is not uncommon 
with industrial forecasts which are 
constructed at the bottom of a cycle and 
similar criticisms can be levied at 
projections of steel, coal and manufacturing 
output undertaken in this period. The 
improvement in demand evident in the latter 
part of the decade has improved the financial 
position of all airports in the Scottish 
system. Indeed, after allowing for changes in 
accounting convention, there has been an 
improvement in Prestiwck's results. Despite 
the setback occasioned by the failure of 
Highland Express in 1987, the airport has 
succeeded in expanding demand and reducing 
losses. As set out above, we view the 
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financial position of Prestwick as a side 
issue. It may well be possible to nudge the 
airport into the black on the basis of 
projected trends. However, the airport 
operates in circumstances in which it cannot 
deliver the feasible maximum range of long 
haul services. In short, it cannot serve 
Scottish needs and interests. 
These forecasts give rise to the possibility 
that Prestwick could flourish in another role. 
However, before embarking upon such 
discussions, a key factor must be clearly 
stated. BAA is now a public limited company 
whose objective is to maximise profits subject 
to constraints imposed by Government. It 
requires to raise capital for investments 
either in the markets or from retained 
earnings and must satisfy its owners as to the 
commercial viability of development plans. The 
advent of a limited open skies policy for 
Scotland implies that airports compete for 
certain aspects of business. In 1985, demand 
was such that the abandonment of Prestwick 
could be plausibly entertained. However, it 
should be noted that no detailed analysis of 
the problems of accommodating Prestwick's 
passenger services on other sites was 
undertaken by the working party. Demand at 
all Scottish airports peaks during the summer 
months. Thus examining annual throughput and 
comparing this with annual terminal capacity 
is likely to be misleading because demand is 
not evenly distributed throughout the year. 
This implies that annual capacity within the 
Scottish system must inevitably be higher than 
annual demand. In addition, short haul 
scheduled services tend to use early morning 
and early evening slots as do certain 
scheduled transatlantic flights. This again 
implies the need for a level of terminal 
capacity above that implied by average 
figures. These observations can be employed 
to suggest that BAA will need its Prestwick 
terminal and that charter flights could be 
diverted to that site. There are 2 possible 
problems with this approach. First, BAA have 
embarked upon an expansion of terminal 
facilities at Glasgow. Due to the probability 
that lowlands policy may change, the exact 
nature, timing and extent of this development 
has not been clearly specified. Second, it 
remains to be seen whether inclusive tour and 
charter operators could be persuaded to base 
operations in Ayrshire. It is our view that 
BAA could eliminate the need for Prestwick's 
terminal through a suitably scaled and phased 
expansion at other sites. The question 
remains at to whether this course would be in 
the best interests of BAA's shareholders. The 
forthcoming review must establish whether 
Prestwick could develop in a charter capacity. 
In liberalised air transport markets, this 
requires to be in the commercial interests of 
parties concerned. Clearly, the net present 
value of the proposed rail halt scheme would 
improve on the basis of this scenario and 
employment effects would be mitigated. 
Although an open skies policy implies 
competition between airports for available 
business, the reality is that Prestwick cannot 
compete in the scheduled service arena. If 
BAA are to continue to operate the Prestwick 
terminal it will be on the basis of a 
commercially viable strategy based upon 
specialisation. Ayrshire interests are 
preparing to bid for Prestwick airport and 
wish to use the terminal in a charter role. 
BAA have indicated that Prestwick is not for 
sale. This development places pressure on BAA 
to examine this option fully, demonstrate 
whether a charter centre is possible and 
establish whether it is a financially 
attractive solution. The possibility exists 
that a charter centre may be possible at 
Prestwick but that BAA's preferred financial 
option would be to rationalise at two 
terminals. How Government react in this 
situation will prove most instructive. Thus, 
although developing a charter centre at 
Prestwick would go some way towards amicably 
resolving the lowlands airports issue, it is 
unclear, ex ante, that this option will emerge 
favourably from Scottish Airports 
calculations. In terms of cargo, one must 
account for the certainty that the runway at 
Prestwick will be retained. In this event, the 
effects upon cargo operators at Prestwick will 
be restricted to the cost penalties deriving 
from the cargo payloads on passenger flights 
being diverted to other sites. The exact 
implications remain to be fully quantified. 
However, an increase in cargo tonnage carried 
by dedicated cargo flights in conjunction with 
recent developments by TNT and Federal Express 
have fostered a view that Prestwick could 
evolve as a specialised cargo centre. The 
review procedure serves an an ideal 
opportunity for examining this proposition, 
identifying opportunities and constraints and 
clarifying the resource inputs required to 
facilitate such an eventuality. Likely 
increases at other site must likewise be 
established and the infrastructural 
implications analysed. 
The consultation document sets out that the 
Transport Secretary does not envisage that a 
persuasive case exists for the "construction 
of yet another airport in a new location"(op 
cit, para 8) In the short run this is 
certainly correct. If one examines the BAA 
forecasts to the year 2005 and sets these 
against current and projected capacity, it 
becomes apparent that consideration of further 
terminal capacity will prove necessary towards 
the middle part of the next decade. By that 
point, both Glasgow and Edinburgh are likely 
to have expanded to an annual terminal 
capacity of 8-9 million passengers. Further 
expansion at these sites is likely to prove 
relatively costly. It is at this point that 
notions of a single central airport will re-
emerge with greater force. The case for such 
development may be underlined if aviation 
markets react to mounting congestion in 
European airspace by decanting activity to 
peripheral hubs. In our view, such matters 
merit serious consideration but are not vital 
to the present exercise. 
Since the Conservatives came to power, 
liberalisation has been employed to further 
broad air transport goals. Whilst this has led 
to tensions in all regions, it has completely 
undermined lowland policy objectives. In the 
Scottish context. Government must take stock 
of whether artificial restrictions either work 
or serve broader objectives. The forthcoming 
review is unlikely to discover any good reason 
why an open skies policy cannot and should not 
be instituted in respect of North American 
services. The additional investment and net 
employment consequences appear minimal. 
Clearly, the exact computation depends upon 
whether Prestwick can develop in a charter 
capacity. As implied above, the peaked nature 
of Scottish demand may well imply a short term 
role for Prestwick until the completion of the 
terminal capacity at Abbotsinch. This may give 
Ayrshire interests the opportunity to forge a 
future in the European charter market. 
(iii) Environmental implications The consultative 
document sets out that "changes in the use of 
airports occur constantly, some with benefit 
to the environment around them, some making 
new demands which have to be evaluated 
carefully against the benefits obtained from 
the change. In this case, the Secretary of 
State will wish to know what effects on noise 
levels, and on road and rail infrastructure, 
and eg on housing developments may be expected 
over the next few years under each of the two 
broad options."(op cit, paral2) 
In section 4, we indicated that the 
environmental effects of transferring 
transatlantic flights to other centres would 
impose less of a reduction in noise levels 
than might otherwise be the case. The 
expansion of terminal capacity at Glasgow 
implies increased ATM's and greater 
environmental disturbance. This is a fait 
accompli which will result on the basis of 
present policies. The relevant issue, in this 
respect, is the additional noise generated by 
the transference of Prestwick business to 
other Lowland airports and any stimulation to 
activity following change. It is not clear how 
this would be distributed between Glasgow and 
Edinburgh. In addition, any decanting of 
charters to the Ayrshire location would 
generate an offsetting reduction in 
disturbance at Abbotsinch and Turnhouse. 
Safety was not an issue which featured in 
previous reviews and is not referred to in the 
present document. In recent times there has 
been a marked loss of public confidence in the 
reliability of mechanical systems. This 
general concern has focused largely upon 
nuclear power generation and transport 
networks. In these contexts, a series of 
accidents and incidents have illustrated 
graphically the vulnerability of both 
consumers and the wider public to random 
mechanical and structural failure, human error 
and craven malice. Thus air transport safety 
is not an issue which the review procedure can 
totally ignore. In terms of the Scottish 
question, the pro-Prestwick lobby seem set to 
indulge in an concerted attempt to heighten 
public anxiety. In recent months 3 related 
points have surfaced. First, attention has 
been drawn to the enhanced security measures 
imposed upon US carriers following the 
Lockerbie disaster. These are argued to pose 
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serious problems for either Glasgow or 
Edinburgh because they imply increased 
congestion and delay at these already over-
stretched facilities. This is a weak argument 
which ignores proposed capital expenditure 
plans which could be suitably amended at low 
marginal cost. Second, there has been a 
sustained attempt to counter the loss of 
locational advantage at Prestwick by calling 
into question the safety of the new extended 
range of twin engined jets on transatlantic 
routes. The changes to the operational 
procedures governing such flights were 
instituted 3 years ago. This decision was made 
by agencies charged, inter alia, with the 
safety of air travellers. Consequently, such 
services are more tightly regulated and 
supervised than those employing four engine 
craft. However, operators at Prestwick either 
currently use or plan to introduce this 
technology on North American routes. It is 
difficult to see how such arguments can assist 
the Prestwick case. The third strand questions 
the suitability of Glasgow as a site and seeks 
to re-admit the discredited view that other 
Scottish runways are too short to support 
viable transatlantic operations. Proposed new 
safety measures are argued to effectively 
reduce runway lengths by allowing more time to 
abort take-off once the appropriate velocity 
has been attained. A shorter effective runway 
is suggested to dictate payload reductions 
which render transatlantic services 
uneconomic. This is disputed by carriers who 
have examined the most restrictive scenarios 
and conclude that the likely effect of these 
measures on revenue would be small. Again this 
argument appears to have little to commend it. 
It is evident that such considerations will be 
threaded together with vague references to 
terrain problems at Glasgow in a conscious 
attempt to undermine public confidence in the 
safety of Glasgow airport. In our view, it is 
not in anyone's interest to parade the dead 
victims of air tragedies before the Scottish 
public in an attempt to prejudice Glasgow. On 
the other hand the authorities cannot afford 
to be complacent about such issues. Government 
should pre-empt any debate by commissioning a 
survey of Glasgow airport and its environs 
and thus settle these issues in a calm and 
informed manner. This exercise should be 
conducted by reputable consulting engineers 
and Government should refuse to accept 
evidence of this nature from a wider audience. 
The Government must act to avoid an unseemly 
and potentially damaging controversy which can 
only serve to undermine what is almost 
universally regarded as a safe and acceptable 
airport. 
The artificial partition of Scotlands Category 
A airport across two sites causes a 
competitive situation which results in fewer 
direct transatlantic services than might 
otherwise occur. Rectifying this anomaly would 
present a stronger basis for the pursuit of a 
wider set of regeneration strategies. The 
emphasis of these programmes favours a pattern 
of labour demand biased in favour of 
professional and skilled occupations. As 
indicated in Section 4 those middle class 
enclaves underneath the Glasgow flightpath 
stand to gain most from such developments. 
These potential long run benefits should be 
employed to offset the marginal increases in 
disturbance which reform of Lowland airports 
policy may occasion. 
(iv) The effect on consumers The consultative 
document sets out the issues thus. "The 
Government's general concern in its aviation 
policy is to create and maintain a structure 
which will produce the greatest long term 
benefit for users of air services, both 
passengers and senders/recipients of cargo. 
The Secretary of State will therefore be 
interested to see respondents include an 
assessment in these terms of whatever 
preference for Scottish airports policy they 
are putting forward."(op cit, para 11) 
Evidence on the size and likely trend in 
transatlantic markets is limited although the 
review procedure will serve to establish such 
matters fully. Economic theory would suggest 
that the removal of airport restrictions in 
central Scotland would engender a higher level 
of direct service based at the locations at 
which demand exists. The indirect competition 
between Prestwick and other lowland sites for 
North American business prevents this from 
happening at the moment. Following reform, the 
market will be subject to a greater level of 
competition than at present. In the short run, 
an over-provision could emerge as carriers 
attempt to consolidate a market position. In 
the medium term the level of service will 
converge upon that which is commercially 
justified. The market will be subject to entry 
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and to competition from other hubs and this 
will prevent the emergence of excess profits. 
Thus there is every indication that removal of 
the Lowland distribution rules will result in 
a greater number of competitively priced seats 
than at present. 
There is a broad consensus in Scotland 
concerning the importance of creating the 
proper basis for wealth creation. Scottish 
interests would argue that the needs of those 
engaged in trade and commerce, including 
foreign tourists, should be afforded a heavy 
weight in the decision-making process. It is 
the value added generated in Scotland which 
underpins the burgeoning demand for foreign 
holidays by the wider public. Thus, any 
additional resource costs implied by the 
possible diversion of large numbers of 
holidaymakers to Prestwick should not be 
afforded the same weight as the resource 
savings which accrue to Scottish industry and 
commerce. In our view, "the greatest long run 
benefit for the users of air services " is 
facilitated by the emergence of the flight 
provision most in line with the needs of 
wealth creators. 
It should be noted that there is a distinct 
possibility that the Secretary of State may 
place emphasis upon the volume of responses 
received for each option. Given this, it is of 
paramount importance that Scottish interests 
make their views known. The Transport 
Secretary should discount the survey of 
relevant opinion undertaken by the Scottish 
Office because this appears to have by-passed 
a large number of key players who cannot 
recall any approach. Recent surveys of opinion 
indicate that an overwhelming proportion of 
those using Glasgow and Edinburgh airports 
favour the removal of restrictions. We are 
confident that this will be pressed upon Mr. 
Parkinson during the review process. 
(v) The effect on the Scottish economy The 
consultative document sets out that "it has 
been alleged by some Scottish business and 
tourism interests that the existing Lowland 
Airports policy has held back growth in the 
Scottish economy, and that the freedom of 
airlines to mount long haul inter-continental 
services from the Scottish Lowland Airport of 
there choice would produce substantial 
improvement. The Secretary of State would be 
interested to see the detailed arguments 
underlying this view, and the associated 
facts, figures and projections substantiating 
it. Others might wish to include an assessment 
of the employment implications, both local to 
the airports concerned and more widely." (op 
cit, para 10) 
The argument developed in previous sections 
relates to the role of air services in enhancing 
the attractiveness of the Scottish locational 
package and the ability of improved provision to 
expedite a wider set of urban, regional and 
sectoral strategies. As indicated in Sections 3 
and 4, such representations were ignored in the 
1985 review. Thus, reference to these issues is 
both welcome and proper. Location decisions are 
complex and we do not view it as appropriate to 
attempt to quantify the growth penalty implied by 
one element in the overall package. We suggest 
that this would be an unreasonable request. The 
1985 White Paper set great store in highlighting 
the capital and other provisions designed to 
promote the development of Manchester 
International Airport. As indicated in Section 6, 
North West interests take a strategic view of the 
role of this facility in regional development. 
This approach receives specific endorsement in 
Cmnd 9542, in which it is suggested that "thriving 
regional airports also provide direct and indirect 
employment in the regions and benefit local 
industry by providing convenient air services for 
businessmen "and that "an airport also creates 
employment which will give rise to a demand for 
additional housing and other facilities and 
services. The beneficial consequences of such a 
development are likely to be widespread."(Cmnd 
9542, paras 6.1 and 2.5) CMPD (1986) sets out how 
such induced effects are inherently 
"unquantifiable." It is our clear impression that 
the evolution of airport in the North West and 
South East is based, inter alia, on strategic 
considerations relating to the service and 
stimulation of the indigenous industrial and 
commercial base. The construction of a fifth 
terminal at Heathrow and the continued expansion 
of Manchester would both assume an enhancement or 
consolidation of the locational features of the 
respective catchment areas. One may validly 
enquire why Scotland requires to be any different. 
The role of air services in in expansion and 
inward investment decisions was set out in Section 
3. In our view, if the removal of restrictions in 
Lowland Scotland results in a greater and more 
acceptable provision of service then Scotland's 
78 
locational competitiveness is enhanced and wider 
strategies accommodated. The future is unknowable 
and it would be unwise to attempt to quantify 
these effects precisely. What will be made evident 
to Mr Parkinson is the overwhelming judgement that 
reform of lowlands policy will enhance growth 
potential. 
The review exercise will present evidence that the 
current policy regime results in business 
travellers eschewing Prestwick in favour of South 
East and other hubs. This is solely because 
Prestwick does not afford the scope and frequency 
required by the majority of such users. From such 
data, the opportunity costs of this practice can 
be derived and this would serve as one measure of 
the penalty implied by a Scottish location. This 
will vary by by area and type of activity and the 
relative importance to different sectors and 
localities can be deduced. The requirement of 
those sectors specified in urban and industrial 
programmes will clearly be of great interest to 
the Transport Secretary. Our earlier summary 
points out that it is in these spheres that the 
need for access to international air services is 
at a premium. 
Tourism is a key national industry in both 
Scottish and UK terms. Hence, Cmnd 9542 sets out 
that "civil aviation is vital to our national 
prosperity . Nearly two thirds of foreign 
tourists to the UK travel by air and tourism is 
one of our most successful growth industries." 
The bulk of Prestwick's business is tourist 
related and there is not one shred of evidence to 
suggest that throughput would reduce following a 
change in Lowland policy. There are clear grounds 
for suggesting that Prestwick does not attract the 
marketing resources which other Lowland 
destinations would command. The aforementioned UAL 
proposal suggests that many US travellers are 
subject to a level of product inertia and tend to 
stick with a given marketing system, usually 
associated with an airline. Thus a significant 
proportion of US travellers choose from a set of 
destinations dictated by the route network of US 
airlines. In the case of UAL, Scotland is not one 
of them. In addition, significant volumes of US 
tourist visitors to Scotland interline at the 
South-East system or elsewhere. For some, this 
reflects a two stage holiday, for others, it 
reflects the marketing system chosen directly or 
indirectly to organise the trip. Estimates of 
foregone Scottish tourist revenue through such 
effects can be obtained. The beneficial effects of 
change depend on the particular outcome in terms 
of US carriers and must be evaluated with 
reference to the potential which various US 
carriers present. It would be our hypothesis that 
opening up other Lowland airports would hook 
direct Scottish destinations into a greater number 
of US marketing systems than at present and would 
reduce unwanted interlining at non Scottish hubs 
and present increased injections of tourist 
revenues into the economy. 
In Section 5, the net impact of change in Lowland 
policy in terms of direct, airport related and 
indirect employment was demonstrated to have been 
positive in 1985. This is based upon the 
relatively small negative effect in Ayrshire 
detected by the working party and the estimates 
submitted in evidence by Glasgow District Council 
but subsequently ignored. Given improved levels of 
transatlantic activity, the net effect is likely 
to be greater. However, as indicated above, the 
improved air transport market affords the 
possibility that Prestwick's terminal may survive. 
This new scenario could result in positive 
employment effects at all Lowland sites. Thus, the 
review must examine what can emerge at Prestwick 
in the short and medium term. An assessment must 
be made of how the site can be expanded to provide 
employment in the area. Policymakers could do 
worse than consider the approach ennunciated by 
the Scottish Select Committee in 1982. A package 
of feasible business opportunities should be 
identified and measures taken to co-ordinate the 
inputs of the parties concerned. 
In the previous section we set out the view that 
resistance to change at Prestwick is grounded upon 
a wider set of fears and anxieties about the 
performance and prospects for the Ayrshire 
economy. One possible interpretation of the trend 
evident in the 1980's is that Ayrshire has the 
potential to develop further as a manufacturing 
centre. It is our view that aerospace developments 
at Prestwick Airport would be vital to this 
process. Such expansion implies a net supply of 
highly skilled engineers and technicians who do 
not exist at the moment. It is evident that many 
young people joined Ayrshire's labour market in 
the late 1970's and 1980's and were faced with few 
opportunities to obtain skills on which to base 
careers and plan futures. This cohort present the 
potential from which a prosperous and high value 
added local economy can be derived in the 1990's. 
At present it is far from obvious that the 
impending Ayrshire Enterprise body can unlock this 
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potential on the basis of national programmes 
targeting limited training opportunities on the 
long term unemployed. Schemes which allocate 
training opportunities to where the greatest 
returns are evident are clearly needed. This 
implies some form of adult apprenticeship offered 
to this cohort irrespective of their present 
employed status. This would create vacancies, 
stimulate local labour markets and eventually 
remove people from the dole queues. 
Another formidable constraint on development is 
the poor state of the road connections to and from 
Ayrshire. If Prestwick develops as a significant 
charter, cargo and industrial centre, this will 
place intolerable pressure on the A737, A77 and 
A76 roads. In strategic terms the case for 
upgrading these roads is unanswerable. In 
particular, improvements to the A76 would open up 
Ayrshire to development pressure from the South 
and provide better scope for attracting activity 
to the depressed Cumnock and Doon Valley area. 
The certain loss of transatlantic business will 
cause understandable upset and anger in Ayrshire. 
In our view such activity presents low growth 
potential in the Prestwick context. These services 
can be used to better effect at other sites and 
the whole central belt will ultimately benefit. 
With feasible and fully resourced strategies 
Ayrshire can share in these opportunities. 
Changing Lowlands policy will provide a better 
basis for all Scottish interest to work to 
improve, develop and attract wealth creating 
activity. There are no easy paths to prosperity. 
Success requires to be earned every day through 
the continued application of hard work and 
ingenuity. This applies in Edinburgh, in Glasgow 
and in Ayrshire. The reform of Scottish Lowland 
Airports policy will complement these efforts. In 
our view, given appropriate support from 
Government and the talents of the Scottish people, 
history may well record that the long overdue 
reform of lowlands policy was good for Scotland 
and good for Ayrshire. 
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Table 1 Analysis of shares of UK airport actvity 
1977 







































































































Table 2 Origin and destination of passengers - analysis of shares 
of BAA translantic market 
Passengers (000s) 
1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 
BAA 5465.8 6741.8 7068.7 6830.6 8311.9 9228.1 
Scotland 322.5 378.1 325.4 240.8 224.9 287.8 
Scottish share X 5.9 5.6 4 .6 3.5 2.7 3.1 
Source: BAA Annual Accounts 
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2,920 1,530 235-260 





1985 review BAA forecasts FAI estimates 
forecast for for Scottish of Lowlands 
2000 system activity 
6,715-7,075 11,000-13,000 8,500-10,500 
Source: BAA, Department of Transport, 1985 
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